Company research

Company researchTSE PRIME · 4071 · FY end SEP

Plus Alpha Consulting Co., Ltd.

Plus Alpha Consulting is a domestic HR SaaS company led by Talent Palette. Contracts with large companies have low churn and generate high returns on capital. Disclosure that helps investors assess growth prospects and capital policy could lead to a reassessment of its valuation.

Company

Plus Alpha Consulting Co., Ltd.

株式会社プラスアルファ・コンサルティング

Provides talent management and marketing SaaS using Japanese-language text analysis.

Last Close
¥2,394
May 19, 2026 · −5% from Aug-25 peak · +105% off Apr-25 trough
Market Cap / enterprise value (EV)
¥101.5bn / ¥86.9bn EV
net cash ¥14.56bn (14% of cap) · payout target raised to 40%
EV / OP · forward
14.7x
trailing 13.1x EV/EBITDA · vs Aug-25 peak ~12.3x fwd
ROCE · trailing
46% · 3yr stable
FY09/23 46% → FY09/24 41% → FY09/25 46% · top of universe
OP Margin · group
45% · seg-wtd
reported 37.3% · 7.4pp corporate-overhead bridge · 1H FY09/26 actual 39.5%
Shares & Float
42.4M sh · ~50% float
founder bloc ~33% · Oasis Mgmt 16.29% · avg daily turnover ~¥598M
01 · Share-price regime

What moved the share price over the past two years?

stock price rose 114% in 4 months from ¥1,170 on April 7, 2025 to ¥2,510 on August 18 of the same year. This move was based on the expectation that Talent Palette would expand to large companies and that profits would increase more than sales growth. Thereafter, the stock price did not fall significantly, and even after three quarters of financial results, ¥1.15bn of goodwill impairment, the company's growth forecast slowing, and the entry of activist investors, the stock price remained within the range of ¥2,000 to ¥2,500. In May 2026, the company revised its shareholder return policy.

4071 vs. TOPIX · 24 months · Daily candle + volume
high price¥2,510 · 2025-08-18 low price¥1,170 · 2025-04-07 Currently¥2,394
Plus Alpha Consulting/Daily 60 day moving average TOPIX Rebase (1308.T) Volume

01 · The rally Plus Alpha Consulting analyzes Japanese business data, including employee surveys, customer feedback and call-center histories, and presents it in a form managers can use without specialist knowledge. Talent Palette has gained adoption among major listed companies. HR solutions, including Talent Palette, Yorisol, R-Shift and R-Kintai, had 2,171 contracts at the end of Q1 FY9/26. Companies with more than 1,000 employees accounted for 40% of contracts and 73% of Talent Palette MRR. Its proprietary Waters language engine has handled Japanese named entities for 17 years, while internal consultants turn customer requests into product features. Management calls this feedback, product development and resale process the PAC cycle. HR solutions maintained a three-year sales CAGR above 30% while margins increased. Existing-contract pricing and mix lifted Q1 FY9/26 Talent Palette ARPU to ¥468,000, up 11.3%, helped by revisions begun in Q3 FY24 and completed in April 2025, options and upgrades. Targeting large customers cut Q1 SG&A 15.9% YoY and marketing costs about 34%. Channel expansion began with Mynavi TalentBase on October 1, 2025. The shares reached a 24-month low of ¥1,170 on April 7, amid growth-stock weakness and limited Q1 contributions from acquired Grow Up and Attack. H1 FY9/25 OP growth of 28.8% supported recovery; on August 13 management raised FY9/25 OP guidance from ¥5,600M to ¥6,100M. The price reached ¥2,510 on August 18, about 12.3x next-twelve-month EV/EBIT based on guidance, returning to the highest valuation among JII’s covered names within four months.

02 · Adjustment from the highs On November 12, 2025, one release carried three messages. FY9/25 OP guidance rose again from ¥6,100M to ¥6,378M as marketing costs continued falling. Impairments totaled ¥1,154M, including ¥1,092M for Grow Up, acquired in 2022 and operating Kimisuka new-graduate recruiting, and ¥61M for Attack recruitment BPO, acquired in 2024. Both had underperformed acquisition plans, and all remaining goodwill was written off. Management also authorized cancellation on November 28 of all 472,250 treasury shares, or 1.10% before cancellation. November 14 results showed sales of ¥17,084M (+22.8%), OP of ¥6,378M (+40.8%), a reported consolidated OP margin of 37.3% and segment-weighted margin of 44.7%. FY9/26 guidance was ¥19,500M sales (+14.1%), ¥7,500M OP (+17.6%) and a 38.5% margin. The shares barely reacted the next trading day despite slower OP growth: investors treated impairments as a one-off cleanup of acquisitions, alongside cancellation and a dividend increase from ¥29 to ¥38. February 13, 2026 Q1 results confirmed that H2’s margin improvement carried into the new year, with sales of ¥4,439M (+14.0%), OP of ¥1,676M (+49.5%) and margin of 37.8%, versus 28.8% a year earlier.

03 · Current position Two developments changed the discussion in late April and early May 2026. Oasis disclosed a stake rising from 8.02% on April 23 to 10.52% on April 27 and 10.62% on May 1, seeking greater returns, board effectiveness and capital allocation engagement. Its filings envisaged continued proposals over twelve months and acquisition of another 5%. The June 24 amendment showed 16.29%, making Oasis the largest shareholder. H1 results on May 13 showed sales of ¥9,341M (+14.2%), OP of ¥3,692M (+32.2%) and net profit of ¥2,518M (+36.0%). Management raised its payout target from 30% to 40%, following August 2025’s increase from 20% to 30%, and introduced an 8% DOE floor. FY9/26 DPS guidance rose from ¥38 to ¥50, 72% above the prior ¥29. H1 delivered 49.2% of full-year OP guidance and a 39.5% margin, 1ppt above the 38.5% target. Activist-backed returns have partly taken hold, but a 40% payout against ¥5,200M guided net profit implies roughly ¥2,120M (¥50 times 42,390,000 shares), only about 2.1% of market value, alongside ¥14.56bn net cash equal to 14.4% of market value. Watch whether H2 margins hold at least 38%, suggesting scope for an upgrade; whether Mynavi TalentBase OEM gains a separate revenue disclosure demonstrating the partner channel; and whether November’s results pair the 40% payout with recurring buybacks.

02 · Investor issues

Three questions dividing investor views

Based on

's most recent quarterly financial results and the IR briefing on May 13th, there are three points at issue. Are the company's forecasts conservative? Will sales partnerships become a second source of growth? Will shareholder returns further expand?

Issue 01 · Will profit margins be sustained?
Is the operating profit +17.6% forecast for FY9/26 conservative, or will expenses increase in H2?
Bullish Bulls believe that the H1 FY9/26 performance has already shown the possibility of exceeding the company's expectations. H1 operating profit margin39.5%is 1 point higher than the full-year target of 38.5%, compared to the same period last year.+32.2%full-year forecast with operating income of49.2%earned. Q1 was even stronger, with operating income +49.5%, sales +14.0%, and overall SG&A expenses compared to the previous year-15.9%It was. The average cost per customer for Talent Palette is¥468,000(+11.3%). Price increases will come to an end by April 2025, and the effects will be visible throughout the year this term. The use of additional features and migration to higher-level plans continues.This view will hold true if the operating profit margin for Q3 FY9/26 (August 2026) is 38% or higher, the sales growth rate is 13% or higher, and the full-year operating profit is revised upward to ¥7,800M or higher.This is 4% higher than originally planned.
Bearish Bears point out that the H1 profit increase is biased towards Q1. The +49.5% increase in operating profit in Q1 was a temporary increase due to low costs immediately after reducing marketing costs at the end of FY9/25, and we do not think it will be repeatable. In the Q1 operating profit change analysis, personnel expenses were −¥159M as the biggest factor in the decrease in profit, and the number of personnel in charge of OEM for MyNavi has also been increased. The visualization engine for marketing solutions is gradually shrinking, and the number of customers is decreasing compared to the previous year.-96 items744 cases, monthly cancellation rate is1.29%(FY9/25 results). If Talent Palette expands its customer base to include mid-sized companies, acquisition costs will rise again.This view will hold true if the operating profit margin in Q3 FY9/26 falls below 35% and the number of net customer additions slows to less than 100 compared to the same period last year.
Issue 02 · Dependence on talent palette
With Talent Palette accounting for about two-thirds of the group's sales, will OEM partnerships become a second source of growth?
Bullish Bulls see Talent Palette not as a single product, but as a foundation upon which many features can be mounted. Over 7,200 functions have been added over 9 years, and a total of 4,500 companies have adopted the Japanese NLP engine "Waters", which was developed over 17 years. With an OEM partnership, you can expand your sales network without issuing new shares. Mynavi TalentBase, launched on October 1, 2025, combines Mynavi's job information with SHL's aptitude test and engagement diagnosis. In November 2025, the company plans to enter into a capital and business alliance with Lux, and to provide OEM products "Rakuraku Personnel and Labor Affairs" for companies with 300 or fewer employees by FY9/26. In the same month, it also became LinkedIn's first alliance partner in Japan.Q4 If OEM sales for MyNavi are separately disclosed by FY9/26 and the annual rate reaches ¥500M or higher as of the start of FY9/27, this view will hold true.
Bearish Bearish groups believe that HR solutions will increase group sales in FY9/25.77.5%of which the talent palette accounts for approximately85%- Noted that roughly two-thirds of the company relies on a single SaaS product. The remaining 22.5% of marketing solutions are shrinking with a monthly churn rate of 1.29% (FY9/25 results). The company's M&A track record in recruitment-related adjacent businesses is weak: The Grow Up + Attack ¥1.15bn impairment at the end of FY9/25 shows this. There are currently zero disclosure figures from partner OEMs, and qualitative pipeline commentary alone is not the basis for evaluation. The view is established becauseThe number of visualization engine customers has fallen below 700, and Talent Palette ARPU growth rate has fallen below +5% YoY as of Q3 FY9/26This is the case.
Issue 03 · Capital allocation
Are the dividend payout ratio of 40% and DOE of 8% announced on May 13th a starting point for further expanding shareholder returns?
Bullish Bulls point out that the dividend policy revision on May 13, 2026 implemented three things simultaneously — increasing the dividend payout ratio target from 30%40%raised to newDOE (Dividend on Equity) 8%Introduced lower limit, FY9/26 DPS forecast from ¥38¥50Revised to (+72% compared to the previous term's results ¥29).¥15.46bnof net cash (end of Q2)¥125.8bnFor businesses with a sustainable ROE of 28% or more relative to market capitalization, a 40% dividend payout ratio and regular stock buybacks can coexist mathematically. The fact that Oasis Management's position (16.29%, largest shareholder in the change report submitted on June 24th) has explicitly requested an increase in shareholder returns, and has also expressed an intention to acquire more than 5%, increases the probability of a programmed response. The view is established becauseFY9/26 financial results scheduled for November 2026 will include a 40% dividend payout ratio and a regular share buyback resolutionThis is the case.
Bearish The bearish side is the Founder's Block — CEO Katsuya Mimuro (personal holdings 12.12% + asset management company Alpha Style 5.53%) and vice president Kenji Suzumura (personal holdings 10.49% + Plus Energy 5.29%), with a total of approximately33%— points out that the company has control and capital allocation decisions are still owner-driven. November 2025472,250 sharesThe retirement is a disposal of the balance of treasury stock accumulated from previous years and is not a new program. 40% dividend payout ratio against FY9/26 expected net income ¥5,200M is approximately ¥2,120M — approx. of market capitalization2.1%— Based on the run rate of H1, the net cash at the end of FY9/26 exceeds ¥1.6bn. The view is established becauseDividend payout ratio target of 40% is maintained in FY9/26 financial results, and net cash exceeds ¥1.6bn without additional share buyback resolutionThis is the case.
03 · Catalyst

What you can do to increase capital efficiency

List three evaluation materials related to

disclosure and capital policy. In either case, the evaluation can be changed to without waiting for profits to increase.

Improvement measure 01 · Disclosure
Independent disclosure of sales via OEM (Mynavi + Lux)
Progress of partner OEMs (as of Q1 FY9/26)
Mynavi TalentBase
2025-10-01 Start
Lux Rakuraku Human Resources and Labor Affairs
During FY9/26
Partnership with LinkedIn
Signed in November 2025
Separately disclosed sales
None
Three partner OEMs are in progress · Currently, the individually disclosed sales contribution is zero
Although the company positions the partner channel as a "second engine of transformation," the FY9/26 guidance does not quantitatively incorporate OEM contributions. Market Discounts Qualitative Pipeline Commentary After Grow Up/Attack Impairment in November 2025. Disclose Mynavi OEM sales as an independent sales line — even if FY9/26¥150〜300M, as of FY9/27¥500M or moreEven on a small scale, or even just showing the OEM share of HR solution sales on a quarterly basis — it turns the narrative into evidence and forces stock prices to factor in partner options that the market currently ignores.
execution burden
Added one line of segment details to quarterly financial statements
Earliest confirmation time
Q3 FY9/26 financial results · August 2026
Improvement measure 02 · Capital policy
Will regular share buybacks be added to the 40% dividend payout ratio?
FY9/26 Shareholder return composition
DPS ¥50 (expected)
¥2,120M
Stock buyback
None
Expected net profit
¥5,200M
Net cash on balance sheet
¥14,560M
While ROE exceeds 28%, the minimum dividend payout ratio is 40% and DOE 8%, while the net cash market capitalization ratio has expanded to 14.4%.
The May 13 dividend revision raised the payout target from 30% to 40% and introduced an 8% DOE floor, partially delivering the capital-return catalyst. Against FY9/26 guided net profit of ¥5,200M, a 40% payout implies about ¥2,120M, or 2.1% of market capitalization, while net cash continues to accumulate. Concrete options for the November 2026 board meeting include:Annual ¥3~5bn share buyback limit(3-5% of market capitalization), currentLevel exceeding 40% dividend payout ratioA policy of setting a total return floor forNet cash/market capitalization ratio 15%A threshold policy that automatically triggers share buybacks if exceeded - both convert the overcapitalization BS into a revaluation event, a formal response to the activist engagement that began in April 2026.
execution burden
1 board resolution
Earliest confirmation time
FY9/26 financial results · November 2026
Improvement measure 03 · Disclosure
Talent Palette ARPU Growth Rate Quarterly Breakdown
Talent Palette ARPU by customer size (end of FY9/25, 1,000 yen/month)
Over 5,000 people
¥1,642
1,000-4,999 people
¥613
500-999 people
¥339
200-499 people
¥183
Maximum/minimum band ARPU ratio: 9.0x · While the increase in the ratio of large corporate customers is pushing up ARPU, there is a lack of disclosure of the breakdown, making it difficult to judge sustainability.
The company explains that the +11.3% YoY increase in Talent Palette ARPU in Q1 FY9/26 was due to price revisions that were completed from Q3 FY24 to April 2025, as well as the addition of options and migration to higher-level plans. The effect of price revisions is structurally limited - the contribution disappears once all existing customers have transitioned to contracts after the price increase. If ARPU growth is broken down into “price revisions,” “option additions,” “upward plan migration,” and “mix shifts,” and quarterly trends by enterprise tier are known, the market will be able to quantitatively evaluate the structural sustainability of ARPU expansion. The additional information required is one KPI table from the briefing.
execution burden
Add one KPI table every quarter
Earliest confirmation time
Q3 FY9/26 financial results · August 2026
04 · Valuation

Three scenarios for the next four quarters

Bear, base and bull cases for the next four quarters combine possible results and disclosures. They do not predict a single future outcome.

bearish scenario
¥1,800 – ¥2,000
−25%〜−16%
Estimated valuation multiple ~9~10x EV/EBIT (next 12 months)
Incremental margin for H1 has been brought forward,Sales contribution from partner OEMs cannot be confirmed yet., capital only accumulates.
Requirements
  • Q3 FY9/26 operating profit margin35%As the company's operating profit margin falls below the company's plan and the burden of H2 expenses becomes heavier, the full-year operating profit margin will come in at 38.5%, which was the company's plan.
  • Talent Palette's net increase in customer numbers has slowed down to less than 100 compared to the same period last year, and the ARPU growth rate has also fallen below +5%.
  • The number of visualization engine customers will fall below 700, and the segment's contribution to operating income will turn negative.
  • The dividend payout ratio target of 40% was maintained in FY9/26 results, there was no additional share buyback, and net cash¥16bnBreak through.
  • OEM sales are not disclosed separately, and it is not possible to confirm how much sales through partners actually contribute to sales.
¥1,800~¥2,000 in the

bearish scenario is equivalent to approximately 9-10 times EV/EBIT for the next 12 months of FY26. While this is well below the valuation level of SaaS's peers in Japan, as a business with a ROCE of 46%, it still exceeds the EV/EBIT of 7 to 10 times, which is the current trend when taking similar companies private in Japan. Even if Talent Palette's profit margin continues to improve, if the market's valuation multiple remains low, it will remain at this level.

Basic scenario
¥2,500 – ¥2,900
+4%〜+21%
Estimated valuation multiple · ~12-14x EV/EBIT (next 12 months)
H1 incremental margin persists,One of the three measures realized。
Requirements
  • Q3 FY9/26 operating profit margin≥37%・Sales growth rate ≥13%, FY9/26 full year operating profit≥¥7,800M(planned +4%).
  • Net increase in the number of Talent Palette customers by over 150 compared to the same period last year (Enterprise + Mynavi OEM contributions).
  • Either individual disclosure of Mynavi OEM sales or a resolution to repurchase shares in the FY9/26 financial results.
  • The ARPU breakdown will be disclosed quarterly at the Q3 or Q4 briefing.
bullish scenario
¥3,200 – ¥3,800
+34%〜+59%
Estimated valuation multiple · ~15-18x EV/EBIT (next 12 months)
Two of the three measures were realized, confirming that the incremental margin of H1 is structurally persistent.
Requirements
  • Q3 FY9/26 operating profit margin≥40%・Sales growth rate ≥14%, FY9/26 full year operating profit≥¥8,200M(planned +9%), upward revision announced.
  • Talent Palette ARPU growth rate YoY+10% or moreThe net increase in customer numbers accelerated to more than 250 compared to the same period last year.
  • Mynavi OEM sales¥150〜300MAs of FY9/27, it will be disclosed separately at the level¥500M superIndicates a situation in which sales can be expected.
  • In the FY9/26 financial results, we decided to repurchase our own shares (3% to 5% of market capitalization) and set a dividend payout ratio of 40%.
  • The capital allocation policy based on dialogue with Oasis Management has been clearly stated in the IR materials, and the founding family shareholders also support this policy.
The upper limit of the

bull case is ¥3,800, which is the level when the next 12 months EV/EBIT is revalued to ~ 15 to 18 times . This is consistent with the valuation range of mid-sized US HR-SaaS companies (Paycom, Paylocity), and will surpass the level at which two domestic VOC/CDP companies have fallen to ~9x next 12-month EV/EBIT by mid-2026. A higher rating will require overseas expansion or a structural recovery of marketing solutions. However, since Waters' competitive advantage of Japanese NLP cannot be directly exported overseas, it is difficult to confirm this in the next four quarters.

SOTP · HR Solutions
Talent Palette + Yorisol + R-Shift + High Care Wellness · 77.5% of group sales
FY9/26 Segment sales (estimated)~¥15,100M
Segment operating profit margin (FY9/25 results)44.8%
Intermediate case segment operating income~¥7,000〜7,200M
Applicable multiple: Next 12 months EV/EBIT 14-16x~¥980~115 billion EV
Medium case HR EV:~¥105bn(15 times the segment operating profit for the next 12 months). Evaluated by position relative to the median peer ladder below.
SOTP · Marketing Solutions
Visualization engine + customer rings · 22.5% of group sales
FY9/26 Segment sales (estimated)~¥4,400M
Segment operating profit margin (FY9/25 results)44.5%
Intermediate case segment operating income~¥1,760M
Applicable multiple: Next 12 months EV/EBIT 10-12x~¥176~21.1 billion EV
Comparison guideline: User Local (3984, the only listed text mining/VOC analysis specialist) has an EV/EBIT of ~8.7x for the next 12 months based on the closing price on July 10, 2026/~7.9x of the most recent actual EV/EBITDA.
Comparison of valuation multiples with other companies in the same industry · As of July 10, 2026
Domestic SaaS/data platform listed peer companies Next 12 months EV/EBIT / Latest performance EV/EBITDA
3984 User local text mining VOC8.7x / 7.9x
4071 Plus Alpha Consulting · This brand14.7x / 13.1x
4165 Plaid · CDP / KARTE8.9x / 14.8x
4180 Appier Group · Asia AI Platform (IFRS)18.6x / 12.0x
Peer median price next 12 months ~9x · Plus alpha (14.7x)Intermediate level for comparison- Higher than two domestic VOC/CDP stocks (User Local and Plaid, both derated to ~9x) and lower than Appier's IFRS Asia AI multiple. EV/EBIT for the next 12 months will be recalculated using the closing price on July 10, 2026: divide the current EV (closing price x number of shares - net cash) by the operating profit guidance for the next fiscal year published by each company. Kaonavi (4435) is excluded from the ladder — Delisted from the TSE due to going private.
SOTP Crosscheck · Total
Add net cash to business EV to estimate market capitalization
HR Solution EV (next 12 months EV/EBIT 14-16x)~¥980~115 billion
Marketing Solution EV (next 12 months EV/EBIT 10-12x)~¥176~21.1 billion
Net cash addition¥14,560M
Estimated range of market capitalization by SOTP~¥1,300~151 billion
Current market capitalization (July 10th)¥125.8bn
In the intermediate case of SOTP, the current stock price is+3%〜+20%The estimate is higher than that. At the lower limit, there is only a single-digit percentage increase, and this level is not derived from an investment hypothesis specific to this stock, but is a reference value based on the median price of other companies in the same industry. The column for each scenario shows which materials would narrow the gap with the current evaluation.
Important Disclaimer · Important notice

This material is not investment advice.

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