TSE GROWTH · 4168 · FY end DEC 株式会社ヤプリ

Yappli, Inc.

No-code Mobile DX Platform · Multi-product engagement SaaS
Last Close
¥745May 19, 2026
−41% from Aug-25 peak · +27% off Apr-25 trough
Market Cap / EV
¥9.52bn / ¥8.48bn EV
net cash ¥1.04bn (11% of cap) · FY12/25 total payout 34%
EV / OP · forward
8.5x
trailing 9.6x · vs Aug-25 peak ~15x fwd · strict pass (≤12x)
Return on capital · trailing
24%
FY12/24 20.5% → FY12/25 24% · re-accelerating · ROE 37% on tax-shield-lifted NI
OP margin
23% · 1Q FY12/26 actual
FY12/25 reported 14.6% · FY12/26 guide 14.7% · 1Q record, ad-spend back-end-loaded
Shares & Float
12.78M sh · TSE Growth
treasury 209k (1.6%) · avg daily turnover ~¥79M · 60d
INTRODUCTION

What does Yappli do?

Yappli provides a no-code mobile-app platform. Companies can build and operate iOS and Android apps without writing most code in-house. The paying customer is the enterprise or operator that runs the app; end users are its shoppers, members, or employees. The product value is ongoing operation — content updates, push notifications, ID and point-card functions, and app-store compatibility support — not just initial launch. Roughly 80% of revenue comes from recurring platform subscriptions, with the rest from implementation and growth support. Once app operations sit inside Yappli’s workflow, switching frictions can rise. The business becomes more valuable if customer growth and higher subscription revenue outweigh the cost of winning and serving each account. Churn, monthly subscription fees per logo, and contract growth will show whether that is happening.

01 · PRICE REGIME

What has driven the stock over the past two years?

Growth recovered, but profitability and disclosure still govern the multiple.

4168 vs TOPIX · 24 months · daily candles + volume
Peak ¥1,263 · 2025-08-18 Trough ¥585 · 2025-04-07 Today ¥745
Yappli · daily candles 60-day SMA TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · THE RALLY Yappli sells a no-code mobile-app platform used by non-developers at retail-apparel chains, restaurant operators, sports teams, and a growing internal-app customer set. In practice, customers are not only buying app creation. They are buying daily app operations inside one system: Apple and Google store-review handling, OS-update compatibility, push notifications, member ID, point-card functions, and content management. Revenue comes in two layers: recurring platform subscriptions at around 80% of sales, plus one-time professional-services support (creation support at signing and growth support after launch) at around 20%.

02 · THE REVERSAL On November 13, 2025 management did two things in a single disclosure. First, it upward-revised the FY12/25 OP guide from ¥750M to ¥830M and raised the dividend forecast in tandem; read alone, the revision should have extended the climb. Second, a separate release the same day announced the acquisition of Choose Monster for ¥130M cash, of which ¥113M — 87% of the purchase price — was recognized as goodwill amortized over nine years, with no published comparison to the alternative of repurchasing ¥130M of Yappli stock at the then-prevailing valuation.

03 · WHERE WE STAND NOW The 1Q FY12/26 print landed on May 13, 2026: revenue ¥1,707M (+19.1% YoY), OP ¥396M (+77.6% YoY), net income ¥390M (+75.1% YoY), and OP margin at an all-time high of 23.2% — 8.5ppt above the FY12/26 full-year guide of 14.7%. Gross-revenue churn (LTM) improved from 0.92% to 0.86%, ahead of management's prior "2H FY12/26 improvement" timeline. The lifetime-value-to-acquisition-cost ratio climbed to 6.6x, above management's own 5x re-investment threshold.

02 · CONTENTION

Which debates are driving the stock now?

Retention, margins, and capital allocation now drive the debate.

DEBATE 01 · MARGIN DURABILITY
Is the 1Q margin durable, or will resumed advertising reverse it?
BULL
  • The first-quarter result shows operating leverage despite a higher cost base. If advertising returns to the planned pace, the durability of that margin will depend on subscription growth rather than timing.
BEAR
  • The 1Q 23.2% margin embeds professional-services mix favorability (creation-support pulled forward) plus an ad-spend timing benefit of roughly ¥30M as 1Q ran below the ¥180M / quarter guided cadence.
DEBATE 02 · CAPITAL RETURN
Is the ¥15 dividend temporary, or the natural ceiling while Yappli invests?
BULL
  • Yappli now runs a 37% ROE with ¥1.04bn of net cash.
BEAR
  • Management still puts growth investment first. The November 2025 Choose Monster acquisition showed that priority: ¥130M was deployed with 87% recorded as goodwill, and management has published no post-mortem.
DEBATE 03 · MULTI-PRODUCT PIVOT
Does the four-product line lift average revenue per logo and total contract count, or dilute the headline subscription economics?
BULL
  • Average monthly subscription fee per logo held steady at ¥466k (+3.9% YoY) despite WebX and MiniApp being lower-priced.
  • Cited cross-sell wins at Alpen, Dr. Martens, and Sarutahiko Coffee show enterprises consolidating more of their digital operations on Yappli.
BEAR
  • Cohort-level retention is not disclosed; HR / UNITE growth may be diluting an elevated Marketing-cohort number.
03 · CATALYST

What could change over the next twelve months?

Three disclosures could make Yappli's earnings quality easier to judge.

LEVER 01 · CAPITAL POLICY
Formalize the total-return policy — lift the payout floor
FY12/25 capital return composition & deployment gap
FY12/25 dividend
¥166M
FY12/25 buyback
¥149M
FY12/25 net income
¥920M
Net cash on BS
¥1,041M
FY12/25 total payout 34% on ROE 37% · FY12/26 buyback undecided · cash pile growing
  • Yappli generated ¥776M of operating cash in FY12/25 and ended with ¥1.04bn of net cash. Its disclosed R&D, capex, and Choose Monster acquisition used less than that amount. A formula-based return policy would send the undeployed surplus back to shareholders.
What it takes
One board resolution + one IR slide
When it could happen
2Q FY12/26 release · Aug 2026
LEVER 02 · DISCLOSURE
Cohort-level churn & NRR by solution domain
FY12/25-1Q FY12/26 LTM churn · headline vs cohort weights
Marketing cohort (62%)
~1.1% est.
HR / UNITE cohort (16%)
~0.3% est.
Other (22%)
~0.8% est.
Headline LTM (disclosed)
0.86%
cohort weights inferred from contract-count disclosure · cohort-level churn not published
  • The customer base splits into three distinct segments — retail and e-commerce apps (the Marketing solution), HR and employee-engagement apps (UNITE), and a residual of BtoB, media, and government apps.
  • Disclosing cohort-level LTM churn and net revenue retention by solution domain (Marketing / HR / Other), alongside cohort-level contract counts, separates the structural retention story from the mix-driven headline.
What it takes
One additional KPI table per quarter
When it could happen
2Q FY12/26 release · Aug 2026
LEVER 03 · DISCLOSURE
M&A discipline framework — YFC year-one stand-alone disclosure
Choose Monster (YFC) acquisition mechanics
Purchase price
¥130M
Goodwill recognized
¥113M (87%)
Net tangible assets
¥17M
9-yr SL amortization
¥12.6M/yr
no published comparison to alternative deployment (e.g., ¥130M buyback at then-prevailing valuation)
  • Publishing YFC year-one stand-alone revenue and OP at the FY12/26 results disclosure, alongside a CFO-signed IRR-vs-alternative-use threshold for future deals, institutionalizes the capital-allocation discipline that the April 1 CFO appointment hinted at.
What it takes
One IR slide + one YUHO note
When it could happen
FY12/26 results · Feb 2027
04 · VALUATION

What has to be true for the stock to work from here?

The cases connect operating outcomes to today's valuation.

BEAR SCENARIO
¥550 – ¥650
−26% to −13%
implied multiple · ~5–6x EV/OP (fwd)
The 1Q OP margin was timing; Marketing-cohort churn re-deteriorates; capital sits.

The bear band of ¥550–¥650 implies ~4.6–5.6x FY12/26 forward EV/OP — meaningfully below the Japanese mid-cap SaaS peer band of 10–15x and below the JP private-buyer 7–10x cohort for asset-light specialty technology businesses. Multiple-driven only if the market discounts the recurring book's durability beyond what a strategic acquirer would pay for it.

BASE SCENARIO
¥850 – ¥1,000
+14% to +34%
implied multiple · ~10–11x EV/OP (fwd)
The 1Q margin holds enough to drive an upward revision, and Yappli begins publishing cohort churn and NRR by solution.
BULL SCENARIO
¥1,150 – ¥1,350
+54% to +81%
implied multiple · ~13–15x EV/OP (fwd)
Yappli formalizes its total-return policy and publishes cohort retention; it also explains the FY12/27 tax-shield runoff before it reaches earnings.

The bull peak of ¥1,350 sits modestly above the August 2025 high of ¥1,263 and embeds a re-rating to ~13-15x forward EV/OP — in the band where Japanese profitable mid-cap SaaS names like Cybozu (10x), PR TIMES (12x), and HENNGE (25x) cluster. Re-rating beyond that requires Yappli WebX and MiniApp turning into second compounding engines, which is multi-year optionality outside the four-quarter scenario.

SUM-OF-PARTS · CORE YAPPLI PLATFORM
Yappli + Yappli WebX + Yappli MiniApp · ~95% of group revenue
FY12/26 segment revenue (est.)~¥6.5bn
Segment OPM (FY12/26 guide proxy)~15%
Implied segment OP mid-case~¥975M
Peer multiple (Cybozu 10x, PR TIMES 12x)~10–12x EV/OP
Mid-case implied EV: ~¥10–12bn at 11x fwd segment OP
SUM-OF-PARTS · YFC + EQUITY METHOD + NET CASH
Yappli Food Connect (51.4%) + Fuller equity method (21.8%) + net cash
YFC FY12/26 revenue (est.)~¥250–400M
YFC implied EV @ 1.5–2x rev~¥375–800M
Fuller equity-method book value¥499M
Excess net cash add-back¥1,041M
SOTP cross-check vs current EV~¥11–14bn MC vs ¥9.5bn
The operating platform, smaller investments, and net cash reach the base-to-bull range when retention and capital returns become easier to underwrite.
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