TSE GROWTH · 5570 · FY end SEP 株式会社ジェノバ
JENOBA Co., Ltd.
Monthly subscription that turns a GPS receiver into a centimeter-accurate positioning tool
Last Close
¥677May 28
−23% from 24-month peak ¥875 · +26% off 24-month trough ¥539
Market Cap / EV
¥9.0bn / EV ¥5.9bn
ex-treasury basis · net cash ¥3.0bn (cash ¥3.05bn · zero debt) = 34% of market cap
EV / OP · forward
7.6x
ex-treasury EV ÷ FY9/26E company OP guidance ¥779M
ROCE · trailing
23% · FY9/25
EBIT ÷ capital employed · ROE 15.8% (per YUHO)
OP margin · standalone
56.6% · FY9/25
FY9/26 co. guidance 54.4% (server-refresh drag)
Shares & Float
13.23M sh · ex-treasury
float ~35% · Minami family 39.5% · Topcon 11.3% (ex-treasury)
INTRODUCTION

What does JENOBA do?

JENOBA helps people in Japan find out exactly where they are. The customer is a surveyor measuring a piece of land, a contractor running a bulldozer on a construction site, a farmer steering a tractor across a rice field, or a drone operator mapping a forest. They pay JENOBA a monthly subscription because ordinary GPS is accurate only to a few meters, which is not enough for these jobs. The workflow is simple: rough GPS position → JENOBA server → correction signal → about two-centimeter accuracy.

The service runs on about 1,300 GPS reference stations (fixed government stations that continuously measure satellite signals) operated by the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan. JENOBA buys live readings through the Japan Surveying Association, the licensed commercial distributor of that network, then processes the readings with its own algorithm (patent number 5832050) and streams the corrected data. This corrected output is called a correction signal: data that adjusts GPS errors in real time so field users can work at centimeter-level precision. In the year ended September 2025, the company sold ¥1,367 million of subscriptions. Operating profit (OP) was ¥774 million, so OP margin (OP divided by sales) was 56.6%. That margin is why the stock has often traded as a quality utility. The check for FY9/26 is whether server and software spending is temporary, or whether depreciation resets margin closer to 50%.

The company had 9,348 paying subscribers at FY9/25 year-end. Subscriber count has grown about 6% a year for five years. That makes JENOBA predictable, but not fast-growing. The check is whether KDDI-linked new fields can lift growth into the 7–8% range without requiring a much larger cost base. At the end of March 2026, JENOBA held ¥3.05bn in cash and deposits, equal to about one-third of market value (cash and deposits divided by market capitalization). That cash protects downside, but it also depresses ROE if it is not returned or redeployed.

JENOBA is a high-margin subscription utility for centimeter-level positioning. The stock question is not whether the existing business is good. It is whether a 6% subscriber grower with a 57% OP margin can turn its ¥3.05bn cash pile into either growth, buybacks, or a higher dividend before ROE keeps drifting lower. In May 2026, management held full-year guidance steady and raised the dividend from ¥6 to ¥7 per share. The next check is whether capital allocation becomes repeatable policy, not one-off actions.

01 · PRICE REGIME

What has driven the stock over the past two years?

In two years the stock has traced a wide arc. It rose to ¥875 in July 2024, fell 38% to ¥539 by April 2025, and has since recovered to ¥677. The chart below shows how those moves lined up with the company’s disclosures.

5570 vs TOPIX · Daily candlestick + volume
Peak ¥875 · 2024-07-01 Trough ¥539 · 2025-04-07 Current ¥677
JENOBA · Daily 60-day moving average TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · PEAK REGIME JENOBA listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Growth market in April 2023. Its first full year as a listed company (ending September 2023) showed sales up 3.8% YoY and 626 net new paying subscribers. Investors who looked at this saw a service that grew steadily and kept 57 yen of every 100 yen in sales as OP. By July 2024 the stock had climbed to ¥875. At that price, investors were paying roughly 17 times the company’s trailing earnings — a normal multiple for a small Japanese growth company with this kind of margin.

02 · CORRECTION Between late 2024 and April 2025 the stock fell from ¥875 to ¥539, a drop of 38%. The Tokyo market overall was roughly flat in the same period, so this was not just market weather. Two things changed in the disclosures. First, the pace of new subscriber sign-ups slowed: FY9/24 had 535 net new subscribers; FY9/25 had only 284. Second, ROE had been drifting lower for four straight years — from 20% in 2021 down to 14.5% by 2024. Investors noticed both.

03 · BUYBACK + RECORD EARNINGS In February 2025, after dissolving its business alliance with Hitachi Industrial Equipment Systems, the company bought back Hitachi IES’s entire 1,000,000-share stake via ToSTNeT-3 at ¥740 per share — ¥740 million, 7.21% of shares outstanding excluding treasury. Treasury shares rose from 607,000 to 1,607,000, and earnings per remaining share went up. In November 2025 the company posted another record-revenue year (sales of ¥1.37 billion, OP margin 57%). In the same month it released its updated Growth Plan disclosure, the document the Tokyo Stock Exchange requires every Growth-market listed company to file in place of a medium-term plan.

04 · CURRENT On 12 May 2026 the company released its 1H results for the year ending September 2026. Sales rose 4.8% YoY, OP rose 3.3% YoY, and net income rose 4.2% YoY — each a 1H record. Gross margin fell slightly because the company replaced its main servers, booking ¥38 million of hardware and ¥84 million of new software in the first six months alone. Full-year guidance was unchanged at +4.8% YoY revenue and +0.7% YoY OP; the dividend rose from ¥6 to ¥7. The stock today is ¥677 — mid-range of the past two years, with cash now equal to 34% of market value.

02 · CONTENTION

Three questions the market is debating

Margin durability, single-source upstream dependency, and the use of the cash pile — what the bulls and bears each see.

Can JENOBA keep 55%+ margins after the FY9/26 software and server refresh?
Is the lower OP margin guided for FY9/26 a one-year refresh effect, or the start of something structural?
BULL
The company says the drop is one-off. In the 1H of FY9/26 it spent ¥122 million on new servers and new software — already more than all of FY9/25. The cost of buying GPS reference-station data is a fixed annual fee, so each new subscriber adds revenue at almost no extra cost. The check is whether OP margin in the 2H clears 55% and the full-year result beats the 54.4% guide.
BEAR
The bear reading is that this is software investment, not hardware refresh. The company’s intangible-asset balance went from ¥6 million at end-FY9/24 to ¥133 million at end-March 2026 — a 22-fold rise in 18 months. Software depreciates over five years, so the annual depreciation charge will rise toward ¥26–35 million by FY9/27 on top of today’s ¥45 million. If subscriber growth stays at 6%, that extra depreciation pulls steady-state OP margin closer to 50% than 57%.
Is the single data supplier a moat, or the one risk JENOBA cannot control?
Is sourcing all the reference-station data from one supplier a moat, or a single point of failure?
BULL
The Japan Surveying Association is the only organization the government licenses to sell live readings from the country’s 1,300 GPS reference stations to commercial users. JENOBA has been a customer since the data was first made available in May 2002. Anyone who wanted to compete would have to go through the same single supplier and would have nothing JENOBA does not already have. Twenty-four years of stable pricing from the Association is the bull’s main evidence.
BEAR
JENOBA has no negotiating leverage with its only supplier. The annual report names this as a risk in plain language. Twenty-four years of stable pricing is not a guarantee — the longer a streak runs, the larger any one-time adjustment can be. Separately, Japan’s own positioning satellites broadcast a free correction signal that has been improving YoY. If that free signal becomes accurate enough for basic agriculture and sub-meter surveying, JENOBA loses the entry-level part of its customer base.
What will management do with ¥3bn of cash?
How does the ¥3 billion in cash, a third of market value, eventually get returned?
BULL
In February 2025 the company spent ¥740 million buying back its own stock — 7.21% of shares outstanding ex-treasury — absorbing Hitachi IES’s entire stake when their business alliance was dissolved. The company’s Growth Plan disclosure (updated annually) keeps acquisitions in view as part of the strategy, and the KDDI partnership signed in April 2020 is producing new drone and tourism applications. JII estimate: with no debt, ¥3 billion in cash could fund a ¥500 million to ¥1 billion acquisition; deployed at the company’s 23% return on capital, that would add ¥115 to ¥230 million of OP a year.
BEAR
Management talks about acquisitions but does not make them. No deal has been announced. Dividend payout went from 14.3% of profit in FY9/24 to 14.7% in FY9/25 to 17.0% guided for FY9/26 — small moves relative to the cash that comes in each year. Investment securities yield about 1.2%. Every ¥1 billion sitting in cash earns ¥10 to ¥15 million; the same ¥1 billion in the business would earn about ¥230 million.
03 · CATALYST

What could change over the next twelve months?

Three levers — subscriber growth, operating investment, and capital return — with the cost to management and the earliest observable trigger.

Can the KDDI partnership move subscriber growth above the historical 6%?
Can the KDDI partnership lift subscriber growth above the historical 6% a year?
Period-end contract count (IDs, 5-year CAGR 6.0%)
FY9/21
7,393
FY9/22
7,903
FY9/23
8,529
FY9/24
9,064
FY9/25
9,348
FY9/26 2Q (Mar 2026)
9,523
+1,955 net subscribers FY9/21 to FY9/25 · the 2Q FY9/26 figure fell 62 from the Dec 2025 peak of 9,585 on seasonal IT-agriculture inactivity
For five years, JENOBA’s subscriber count has grown 6% a year through its core six fields: surveying, aerial surveying, land-and-house registry, civil ICT construction, IT agriculture, and drones. The next layer of growth is meant to come from the partnership with KDDI signed in April 2020. Several of the proofs of concept — drone delivery, mobility, theme-park audio guides — have started turning into paid services. If subscriber growth moves into the 7–8% range by FY9/27, the discount the market currently puts on the cash pile has room to narrow.
Execution cost
Low (added on top of the existing servers)
Earliest catalyst
FY9/27 1Q (November 2026)
What is the ¥133mn software build-up supposed to produce?
What is the ¥133 million of software the company has built up on its balance sheet actually for?
Software on the balance sheet (intangible assets, period end)
FY9/22
¥13M
FY9/23
¥8M
FY9/24
¥6M
FY9/25
¥61M
Mar 2026
¥133M
+¥127M in 18 months · the largest software-investment cycle in the company’s history
At the end of FY9/24, the company carried ¥6 million of software on its balance sheet. By March 2026 the figure was ¥133 million — most of the rise came in the 1H of FY9/26 alone. The May 2026 disclosure does not say what the software is for. The company has named three growth priorities in writing: partnerships with hardware makers, new fields beyond the original six, and tools for its sales agents. If management explains the use of the spend at the next results release, the market reads it as preparation, not as a drag on margins.
Execution cost
Medium (FY9/26 1H capex annualizes to ~17% of sales)
Earliest catalyst
FY9/26 3Q results (August 2026)
Will the cash pile become buybacks, dividends, M&A — or just more cash?
What does the company do with the ¥3 billion in cash sitting on its balance sheet?
Cash and equity on the balance sheet (March 2026)
Cash & deposits
¥3.05bn
Investments & other assets
¥0.55bn
Market cap
¥8.85bn
Net cash / market cap
34%
FY9/25 operating cash flow ¥589M; FY9/25 return was dividend ¥79M + buyback ¥740M = ¥819M
The one buyback in the company’s history is the ¥740 million it spent in February 2025 — 7.21% of shares outstanding ex-treasury, absorbing Hitachi IES’s exit stake. Nothing similar has been announced since. Operating cash flow was ¥589 million in FY9/25; the dividend took ¥79 million. The other ¥510 million is still in cash. If the company commits to a recurring buyback, raises the dividend payout above 30%, or announces its first outside acquisition, today’s 7.5x forward EV/OP can move toward the 11 times that domestic data-subscription companies trade at.
Execution cost
Low (covered by cash on hand)
Earliest catalyst
FY9/26 full-year result (November 2026)
04 · VALUATION

What has to be true for the stock to work from here?

These are JII valuation scenarios, not company guidance. They use the 27 May 2026 reference price of ¥669, FY9/26 company OP guidance of ¥779M, and JII assumptions about subscriber growth, OP margin, capital return, and valuation multiples. Enterprise value is shown on an ex-treasury basis at ¥5.81bn.

BEAR
¥500 – ¥600
−25% to −10%
Implied multiple · forward EV/OP ~5–6x
The subscription business slows, the new software starts depreciating, and cash keeps piling up without being returned. Subscriber growth eases from 6% a year toward 4%. By FY9/27 the new software pulls OP margin to about 50%. No buyback, no acquisition follows.
5–6x forward EV/OP is less than half of where Topcon trades — a conservative band for a company holding net cash worth 34% of market value.
Key drivers
  • Subscriber growth slows to 4–5% a year
  • Software depreciation pulls OP margin to 50%
  • Cash on the balance sheet rises to ¥3.5bn with no return
  • Japan’s free positioning signal substitutes at the entry level
BASE
¥700 – ¥850
+5% to +27%
Implied multiple · forward EV/OP ~7–9x
The business continues as it has, and capital return improves in steps. Subscribers grow at 6% a year. OP margin stabilizes near 56% by FY9/27. The dividend payout ratio rises toward 20–25%. A second buyback runs roughly once a year, keeping cash from drifting above 25% of market value.
Key drivers
  • Subscriber growth holds at 6% a year
  • FY9/27 OP margin recovers to about 56%
  • Dividend payout ratio rises to 20–25%
  • Named KDDI-linked new-field wins are disclosed individually
BULL
¥900 – ¥1,100
+35% to +65%
Implied multiple · forward EV/OP ~10–12x
New fields and a first acquisition unwind the cash discount. The KDDI partnership produces paid revenue from drone delivery and mobility during FY9/27. Subscriber growth moves into the 7–8% range. Between FY9/26 and FY9/27 the company either announces its first outside acquisition or runs a second buyback worth more than ¥500 million.
10–12x forward EV/OP matches Zenrin (9474, around 11x), the closest Japanese company selling recurring location data.
Key drivers
  • Subscriber growth lifts to 7–8% a year
  • KDDI-linked new fields generate disclosed revenue
  • First outside acquisition announced (¥500M–¥1bn range)
  • Dividend payout ratio rises above 30%
SOTP · Core positioning-data business
Existing subscription business: Network RTK, post-processed data, and J-View correction services for professional positioning users.
FY9/25 revenue (annualized)¥1.33bn
5-year revenue CAGR6.8%
Assumed EV / Revenue3.5–5.0x
Implied business value ¥4.6–6.6bn
SOTP · New fields from the KDDI partnership
KDDI partnership option value across drone delivery, mobility, tourism, and infrastructure inspection.
FY9/25 revenue (embedded)¥30–50M
Assumed growth rate30–50%
Assumed EV / Revenue8.0–12.0x
Implied business value ¥0.2–0.6bn
SOTP · Net cash and investments
Cash and securities, discounted for idle balance-sheet value until returned or redeployed.
Cash & deposits¥3.05bn
Investments & other assets¥0.55bn
Discount for cash sitting idle15–25%
Implied value ¥2.7–3.1bn
SOTP · Comparable companies
Forward EV / OP, range calibration
9474 Zenrin~11x
7732 Topcon~13x
9233 Asia Air Survey~9x
TRMB Trimble~27x
HEXA-B Hexagon AB~22x
Japanese median for subscription / positioning peers is about 11x. Overseas leaders trade at roughly twice that.
SOTP · Equity Bridge
Implied equity value and per-share range
Core distribution business (3.5–5.0x EV/Revenue)¥4.6–6.6bn
New fields (8.0–12.0x EV/Revenue)¥0.2–0.6bn
Net cash + investments (15–25% discount)¥2.7–3.1bn
SOTP implied equity¥7.5–10.3bn
Shares ex-treasury (March 2026)13.23M
Implied per share¥567–¥779
Today’s ¥669 sits roughly mid-range of the SOTP band. The SOTP midpoint is around ¥673, so the stock is near fair value today. Moving meaningfully above requires either new-field monetization or a clearer capital-return policy.
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