TSE STANDARD · 6037 · FY end JUL 楽待株式会社
Rakumachi, Inc.
Real Estate Investment Portal · Rakumachi · Brokerage-subscription marketplace
Last Close
¥977May 26, 2026
−35% from Sep-25 peak · +99% off May-24 trough
Market Cap / EV
¥19.2bn / ¥18.0bn EV
operating net cash ¥1.2bn (6% of cap) · plus ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio (separate non-operating reserve) · zero borrowings
EV / EBIT · forward
10.0x
trailing 11.6x · JP listed digital-marketplace peer median ~7.2x · premium justified by 48.9% OPM
ROCE · trailing
28% · 3yr trend
FY7/23 24.3% → FY7/24 20.1% → FY7/25 28.2% · re-expanding
Operating margin · group
48.9% · FY7/25
H1 FY7/26 55.3% · FY7/26 guide 51.4% · single-segment portal
Shares & Float
19.6M sh · ex-treasury
Sakaguchi family 68.2% · VIS Advisors 5.1% · 850k of buybacks authorized FY7/26
INTRODUCTION

What does Rakumachi do?

Rakumachi runs one marketplace: rakumachi.co.jp, a portal for income-producing real estate in Japan. Brokerage agencies pay recurring monthly listing fees to post properties, while individual investors browse listings and educational content for free. The model keeps margins high because Rakumachi adds paying agencies onto an audience built through search traffic and video distribution, rather than buying large amounts of incremental traffic. The investor debate is whether disclosure trust can be rebuilt after the May 25, 2026 page-view correction, whether the ¥4.08bn bond portfolio will be redeployed, and whether page views, members, and partner stores are still expanding.

6037 vs TOPIX · 24 months · daily candles + volume
Peak ¥1,493 · 2025-09-16 Trough ¥492 · 2024-05-16 Today ¥977
Rakumachi · daily candles 60-day SMA TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · THE RALLY Rakumachi runs one product: the rakumachi.co.jp portal. As of January 2026, 487,000 individual investors use it for free, while 5,459 brokerage agencies pay monthly listing fees to post income-producing properties. Three smaller lines sit on top of that listing model: a patented proposal feature for off-market matching, a Premium subscription with extra tools (ARPU +17% YoY in H1 FY7/26), and tie-up video ads sold to property managers and financial institutions. OPM is high for two operating reasons. Customer acquisition is low because members come through twenty years of Japanese-search ranking and a YouTube channel that passed one billion cumulative views in late 2025. Premium and tie-up video ads also leave pricing room. Separately, outside operations, the company holds a ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio (held to maturity, 5.5% average coupon, generating about ¥114M of interest income each H1). That interest is recorded below operating profit, so it does not lift OPM. It also earns only about a fifth of what the same yen would earn if redeployed into the core business. The stock then rose 3x from ¥492 on May 16, 2024 to ¥1,493 on September 16, 2025 on three disclosures. FY7/24 annual results in September 2024 showed revenue up 13% to ¥2.36bn with OPM at 44.9%, and the company moved ¥4.17bn of cash into the new US-dollar bond portfolio. FY7/25 annual results on September 12, 2025 showed revenue up 33.6% to ¥3.16bn and OP up 45.6% to ¥1.55bn, with OPM at 48.9%. The same day, the company announced founder Naohiro Sakaguchi's succession by Ryo Fujie, the head of marketing, plus a fourth buyback in twelve months of up to 500,000 shares and ¥750M.

02 · THE CONSOLIDATION From the September 2025 peak, the stock fell by about a third over the next eight months, reaching ¥990 on March 13, 2026. But operating performance stayed strong. At the October 2025 annual shareholders' meeting, the board expanded from four directors to seven, adding two long-tenure department heads as inside members. The founder kept his 68.2% holding; the change was governance depth in day-to-day operations. Q1 FY7/26 results in December 2025 and H1 FY7/26 results in March 2026 each showed OP up 43.4% YoY on revenue up 14.9%. H1 OPM was 55.3% on cumulative sales of ¥1,757M. So the pullback did not come from a break in business momentum. A cleaner read is positioning and float: the September 2025 high, after more than tripling from the May 2024 low of ¥492, was set in a thin market. Sakaguchi family ownership is 68.2%. The only other disclosed 5%+ holder is VIS Advisors at 5.08%. The effective free float institutions can trade is about a quarter of shares. In that setup, small incremental buying can push price up sharply, and a small slowdown in that flow can pull it back sharply.

03 · WHERE WE STAND NOW On May 25, 2026, the company filed two announcements on the same day. First, a new buyback: up to 600,000 shares (3.09% of shares outstanding ex-treasury) for up to ¥500M, running through November 27, 2026. Second, a correction notice: the company restated page-view figures in six prior filings back to the FY7/25 annual results. The correction was only about page-view counts. No revenue or profit number was changed. Why that matters: brokerages pay flat monthly listing fees, not per page-view, so billing did not change. What did change was confidence in the KPI series. Restatement size widened from −0.6% in FY7/25 annual, to −5.6% in Q1 FY7/26, to −8.5% in H1 FY7/26. Reported H1 FY7/26 YoY page-view growth therefore moved from +23.2% to +12.7%. The company said the cause was an internal review of the page-view aggregation process and gave no further detail. Over the next four quarters, investors need three checks: whether page-view counting is explained with restated monthly history; whether the ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio (about two-thirds of total assets, earning a fifth of core-business returns) is used for larger buybacks; and whether the niche moat is widening or maturing while Japanese peers trade at a median 7.2x forward EV/EBIT against Rakumachi's 10.0x.

02 · CONTENTION

Which debates are driving the stock now?

These are three open questions from the company's recent quarterly disclosures and the May 25, 2026 correction notice. JII's view is that each question can change a different part of the valuation multiple.

DEBATE 01 · DISCLOSURE INTEGRITY
Did the May 25, 2026 page-view correction fix a one-off counting error, or did it reveal a measurement process investors can no longer trust?
BULL Bulls point out that no revenue or profit line was restated, and agency contracts are priced per listing, not per page impression. So page-views are a demand signal, but they are not the billing base for cash flow. They also note that corrected H1 operating margin still rose eleven points year-on-year to 55.3%, and corrected page-views still grew +22.8% in FY7/2025 and +12.7% in H1 FY7/2026. The view holds if the Q3 FY7/2026 release in June 2026 includes a three-year restated monthly page-view series with a methodology note, and later quarters show no new corrections.
BEAR Bears focus on sequence: the error widened across disclosures, from 0.6% in the FY7/2025 annual to 5.6% in the Q1 FY7/2026 tanshin and 8.5% in the half-year release. They read that pattern as a process issue, not a single bug. They also note the correction was released on the same day as a new buyback authorization, and the company has named no outside provider to assure KPI counting. The view holds if the FY7/2026 annual disclosure in September 2026 adds no third-party KPI assurance and includes another downward restatement of a prior operating metric.
DEBATE 02 · CAPITAL DEPLOYMENT
Is the ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio a prudent reserve, or capital that should already be back in the operating business through buybacks?
BULL Bulls argue management is already signaling the direction: FY7/26 has 850,000 shares and ¥800M of authorized buybacks so far, issued shares fell from 21.15M to 19.75M after the October 2025 cancellation of 1.4M treasury shares, and FY7/26 DPS guidance is ¥13, the fifth straight annual increase. They add that the bond book earns 5.5%, above domestic cash yields, while founder ownership at 68.2% aligns incentives toward shrinking share count rather than issuing stock. The view holds if FY7/27 total capital return (buybacks plus dividends) reaches at least ¥1.5bn and the bond-portfolio balance falls below ¥3.5bn during the year.
BEAR Bears counter that about two-thirds of total assets are still in non-operating securities while the stated dividend payout target stays at 20%, even though the operating business earns 28.2% return on capital. They also point to FX exposure in the bond portfolio as a disclosed risk and note there is still no multi-year total-return framework tied to a drawdown schedule. The view holds if the FY7/2026 annual disclosure in September 2026 keeps the 20% payout target unchanged and the bond-portfolio carrying value ends FY7/2026 above ¥4bn.
DEBATE 03 · MOAT TRAJECTORY
Is Rakumachi still early in market penetration, or is user and partner growth already maturing?
BULL Bulls start with denominator: Rakumachi has 5,459 paying brokerage agencies, about 4% of Japan's roughly 130,000 licensed brokerages. That still leaves 96% of the potential market. They add that YouTube subscribers rose +35.3% YoY to 1.45M, cumulative views passed one billion in late 2025, and Premium subscribers grew +14.7% with ARPU up roughly 17%. The view holds if Q4 FY7/26 in September 2026 shows partner stores above 5,700, registered-member growth above +13% YoY, and Premium-subscriber growth above +15%.
BEAR Bears point to deceleration across the series: registered-member growth slowed from +18% in FY7/22 to +13.2% in FY7/25 and +12.4% in H1 FY7/26; corrected H1 page-view growth dropped from +23.2% to +12.7%; and partner-store growth at +9.0% is the slowest pace in recent quarters. They also note the FY7/25 annual report flags entry by generalist portals SUUMO and LIFULL HOME'S into the investment-property segment. The view holds if FY7/26 annual disclosure prints partner-store growth below +9%, registered-member growth below +12%, and corrected page-view growth below +12% YoY.
03 · CATALYST

What could change over the next twelve months?

These are three disclosure and capital-policy actions drawn from the company's recent filings and the May 25, 2026 correction notice. In JII's framework, each action could re-rate the multiple without requiring higher earnings.

LEVER 01 · DISCLOSURE
Have an outside auditor check the new page-view numbers, and publish how they are now counted
Page-view restatement magnitude · 2026-05-25 correction notice
FY7/2025 annual
−0.6%
Q1 FY7/2026
−5.6%
H1 FY7/2026
−8.5%
Corrected H1 PV growth YoY
+12.7%
Error magnitude grew with each successive release · directional trajectory still positive but halved at the most recent print
The company has explained which past page-view numbers were wrong. It has not yet explained how it will avoid making the same mistake again. Two things would fix that. First, a plain-language description in the next earnings release of how page-views are now counted — which logs the company uses, how duplicate views are removed, what counts as a view. Second, an outside auditor (Ark LLC, the firm that already audits the financial statements, is the obvious choice) confirming that the new counting method is being applied consistently. Without these, investors will start applying a discount to every other number Rakumachi reports, even if those other numbers are not wrong. The cost is roughly ¥3–5M per year in audit fees, plus some internal IT work.
Cost to mgmt
Audit fee + one supplementary table per briefing
Earliest trigger
Q3 FY7/2026 release · June 2026
LEVER 02 · CAPITAL POLICY
Write the actual buyback behavior into a multi-year payout policy, and fund it by drawing down the bond portfolio
Buyback cadence · trailing 12 months · each bar is one tranche, ¥M actually spent
Sep 2024 · tranche 1
¥391M
Dec 2024 · tranche 2
¥357M
Apr 2025 · tranche 3
¥451M
Sep 2025 · tranche 4
¥706M
Mar 2026 · tranche 5 (authorized)
¥300M
May 2026 · tranche 6 (running)
¥500M
Share count · issued
21.15M → 19.75M (−6.6%)
DPS · annual
¥8 → ¥10 → ¥13E (5th lift)
Six tranches in ~20 months, totaling ~¥2.7bn (¥2.2bn used + ¥0.5bn running) · 1.4M treasury shares cancelled Oct 2025 · DPS up every year since FY7/22
Look at the chart above. In FY7/25 the company spent ¥0.28bn on dividends and ¥1.20bn on buybacks — together about 126% of the year's net income of ¥1.17bn. But the company's written dividend policy is still just "payout ratio around 20%." So what the company actually does and what it formally says it does have drifted far apart. The fix is to write the actual behavior into a formal multi-year payout policy: for example, "we will return 80–100% of net income to shareholders every year, partly by drawing ¥1.0–1.5bn per year out of the US-dollar bond portfolio." That turns each quarterly buyback from a one-off surprise into a multi-year plan investors can underwrite. Each yen taken out of those bonds and used for buybacks earns roughly five times what it was earning sitting in the bonds. Cost to management: one board resolution and one paragraph added to the IR materials.
Cost to mgmt
One board resolution + one IR slide
Earliest trigger
FY7/2026 annual · September 2026
LEVER 03 · CAPITAL POLICY
Founder sells part of his own shares to institutional investors, opening the float and clearing the way for a TSE Prime upgrade
Ownership concentration · float and re-rating ceiling
Sakaguchi family (founder + spouse)
68.2%
VIS Advisors LP
5.1%
Director Aoyagi + others
~1%
Effective free float
~26%
Founder bloc and locked positions leave roughly a quarter of the share count actually trading · TSE Prime float threshold sits well above this
Founder Sakaguchi owns 68.2% of Rakumachi. As a result, only about 26% of the company's shares actually trade on the market — what is called a "thin float." A thin float is the structural reason a business with a 48.9% operating margin trades at single-digit forward EV/EBIT: large institutional investors cannot build a position of any size without pushing the price up against themselves. The fix is for Sakaguchi to sell 3–4 million of his own existing shares to institutional buyers. (To be clear: these are shares Sakaguchi already owns, transferred to new buyers. They are not new shares issued by the company — so there is no dilution of existing shareholders.) The sale lifts the tradable float above the roughly 35% minimum that TSE Prime requires. Then the company publishes a timetable for upgrading from TSE Standard to TSE Prime. Preparing for Prime forces the company to set up a board compensation committee, publish English-language investor materials, and meet the disclosure standards that larger listed Japanese companies already meet. Cost to Sakaguchi personally: capital-gains tax on the sale. Cost to the company: the legal and IR work for the upgrade package. Earliest disclosure window: the annual shareholders' meeting in October 2026.
Cost to mgmt
Legal package + IR system buildout
Earliest trigger
AGM · October 2026
04 · VALUATION

What has to be true for the stock to work from here?

JII uses three scenarios for the next four quarters: bear, base, and bull. Each scenario maps a different outcome for the CONTENTION questions and CATALYST levers, then shows a possible share-price range under those assumptions. These are analytical cases, not company guidance and not predictions.

BEAR SCENARIO
¥700 – ¥850
−28% to −13%
implied multiple · ~5.5–6.5x EV/EBIT (fwd)
The corrected page-view trajectory is not audited; partner-store and member growth slow further; the payout target stays at 20% and the bond portfolio is left intact.

The bear band of ¥700–¥850 implies ~5.5–6.5x FY7/2027 forward EV/EBIT — below the listed Japanese small-cap digital-marketplace peer median of 7.2x (LIFULL 6.7x, GA Technologies 7.0x, Temairazu 7.4x) and toward the private-buyer 5–7x cohort that has cleared in the Japanese small-cap listing-platform space.

BASE SCENARIO
¥950 – ¥1,200
−3% to +23%
implied multiple · ~7.5–9.5x EV/EBIT (fwd)
The Q3 release publishes a methodology footnote and a restated three-year monthly page-view series; FY7/2026 guidance is met within 5%; capital return continues at the FY7/2025 cadence without policy restatement.
BULL SCENARIO
¥1,350 – ¥1,650
+38% to +69%
implied multiple · ~10–13x EV/EBIT (fwd)
One of the three levers lands: KPI assurance is introduced, a multi-year total-return policy with a bond-portfolio drawdown timetable is published, or a secondary plus a Prime upgrade timetable opens the float.

The bull band of ¥1,350–¥1,650 implies ~10–13x FY7/2027 forward EV/EBIT — within the Japanese listed digital-marketplace upper band (Azoom 16.4x, GA Technologies 7.0x) and at the lower end of the global niche-portal cohort (Rightmove, REA, Hemnet trade at ~17–25x). The implied multiple at the upper bull band sits roughly three turns above today's 10.0x.

SUM-OF-PARTS · CORE PORTAL PLATFORM
Listing + Proposal + Advertising + Premium + Valuation lines · single reportable segment, ~88% of operating revenue ex non-operating yield
FY7/2026 platform revenue (guide)~¥3.50bn
Segment operating margin (FY7/2026 guide)~51.4%
Implied platform OP mid-case~¥1.80bn
Peer multiple (LIFULL 6.7x, GA Tech 7.0x, Temairazu 7.4x, Azoom 16.4x)~7–16x EV/EBIT
Mid-case implied platform EV: ~¥14–22bn at 8–12x forward platform OP
PEER MULTIPLE LADDER · 2026-06-09
JII-selected peer set of listed Japanese digital marketplaces · EV recomputed at the current share price (2026-06-09)
Rakumachi (6037) · this profile10.0x fwd · ROCE 28%
LIFULL (2120) · residential portal, generalist~6.7x fwd · ROCE 8%
GA Technologies (3491) · proptech, transaction-side~7.0x fwd · ROCE 9%
AZOOM (3496) · single-asset real-estate marketplace~16.4x fwd · ROCE 16%
Temairazu (2477) · small-cap digital marketplace, 73.6% OPM~7.4x fwd · ROCE 16%
Speee (4499) · excluded — FY9/2026 guidance OP lossn/m
On a 2026-06-09 live-close snapshot, the median forward EV/EBIT across these four peers is ~7.2x. Rakumachi trades at 10.0x — about 39% higher than that median. The higher price is justified by Rakumachi's higher OPM (48.9% vs peers in the high-single-digit to low-teens range) and higher ROCE (28.2%).
SUM-OF-PARTS · CROSS-CHECK TOTAL
Core portal platform + non-operating bond portfolio + working cash — the EV bridge to per-share
Core platform EV (mid-case at 10x fwd OP)~¥18bn
USD bond portfolio (held-to-maturity, at carrying)¥4.08bn
Operating cash + short-term securities¥1.41bn
Implied SOTP equity value~¥23.5bn
Implied SOTP per share (÷ 19.64M ex-treasury)~¥1,200
SOTP supports BASE–BULL when one of the three CATALYST levers lands · current market cap ¥19.3bn vs SOTP mid-case ~¥23.5bn
Important Disclaimer · Notice

This is not investment advice.

Japan Investor Interface Co., Ltd. ("JII") is an investor-relations (IR) consultancy. JII is not a registered investment advisor, financial advisor, broker-dealer, or securities firm in any jurisdiction. JII is not registered as a Financial Instruments Business Operator under Japan's Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. JII does not have an Investment Advisory and Agency Business registration and does not provide investment advice or solicit the purchase, sale, or holding of any security.

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