GAKUJO CO., Ltd.
Gakujo operates widely used recruitment media and joint career events for people in their twenties, including the Re-Shukatsu career-change site and new-graduate services. It is debt-free, cash-rich and managed by the founding family. On June 8, 2026 it cut full-year OP guidance to ¥2.6bn while authorizing a ¥650M buyback.
Company
GAKUJO CO., Ltd.
株式会社学情
A recruitment services company specializing in people in their twenties, with recruitment media, scouting, placement services and joint company career events.
- Last Close
- ¥1,547
- Jun 8, 2026 · near a two-year low · a guidance cut and a buyback were both filed today
- Market Cap / enterprise value (EV)
- ¥20.8bn / ¥14.2bn EV
- cash & securities ¥11.3bn · EV nets ¥6.5bn · no debt
- EV / OP · forward
- 5.5x
- FY10/26E OP ¥2.6bn , cut today from ¥3.25bn
- ROCE · trailing
- ~15%
- ROE 16→13% (FY10/24-25) as cash builds and margins invest
- OP Margin · group
- 21.7% · FY10/26E
- FY10/25 21.2% · 1H just 7.5% — 1Q loses money by design
- Shares & Float
- 13.4M ex-tr · 15.6M issued
- treasury 13.7% · founder-family controlled · 5-yr dividend streak
What does Gakujo do?
Gakujo sells recruiting media and events for one group: people in their 20s. Its core product is Re-Shukatsu, a job-search site for workers in their 20s that has been the most-used site of its kind for seven years running and now has 2.8 million registered members, 93% of them in their 20s. Employers pay to list jobs and to scout members. Gakujo also runs a placement agent that charges a fee only when a hire is made, a new-graduate scout site called Re-Shukatsu Campus, and large in-person job fairs (Tenshoku-haku and Shushoku-haku). A smaller business line runs public employment programs under government contracts.
The model is capital-light. Gakujo owns almost no operating assets beyond software; its costs are people, promotion and venue hire, and it carries no debt. So two things matter most. The first is how much it spends to acquire members and brand awareness; the second is when listings go live and when placements close, because revenue is booked on the live date, not when the order is won.
Revenue is steady, but margins are under pressure. In FY10/25 (year to October 2025) Gakujo earned ¥11.0bn of revenue and ¥2.33bn of OP, a 21.2% margin, but OP fell 12% as the company stepped up promotion and system investment. ROCE — profit compared with the capital used in the business — is near 15%, but ROE, measured against all shareholders' equity, slipped from 16.1% to 12.9%, held down by ¥11.3bn of cash and securities on the balance sheet, more than half the company's market value. It has raised its dividend for five straight years and guides a sixth increase in FY10/26.
The latest results matter. After the close on June 8, 2026, Gakujo reported 1H results that fell short of company guidance — revenue up 5.8% YoY but 9% below guidance, OP down 26% YoY. In the same disclosures it cut full-year OP guidance from ¥3.25bn to ¥2.6bn and authorized a ¥650m buyback of up to 3.0% of its shares. Yet order intake rose 11.2% YoY, faster than revenue, and the agent business grew 46% YoY. The key question is simple: does the cut show a weaker franchise, or is this only a timing and investment trough at a debt-free, cash-rich, founder-run compounder trading at about 5.5x forward EV/OP?
What has driven the stock over the past two years?
Margins and guidance mattered more to the stock than revenue growth.
01 · The peak (December 2024) The shares climbed to a two-year high of ¥2,274 on December 13, 2024, after FY10/24 delivered record results — revenue ¥10.7bn and OP up 15% YoY to ¥2.66bn, a 24.8% margin — and management set a higher FY10/25 plan. At the peak the stock traded at about 14x earnings, and investors priced the company as a steady compounder with more growth ahead.
02 · The investment-year de-rating (2025) Through 2025 the stock fell as FY10/25 turned into a margin-compressing investment year. Gakujo lifted member-acquisition promotion and system spending, OP dropped 12% YoY to ¥2.33bn, and the OP margin fell from 24.8% to 21.2%. The shares slid from about ¥2,270 toward ¥1,614 by October 2025 — the stock fell mainly because investors paid a lower multiple after the margin dropped.
03 · Toward the two-year low (early 2026) The de-rating continued into 2026 as the investment phase continued with no clear margin recovery. By late May the shares had eased to about ¥1,596, and on June 3, 2026 they touched a two-year low of ¥1,554 — just before results.
04 · Where the stock stands now Gakujo closed at ¥1,547 on June 8, 2026. After the market closed, the company cut its full-year OP guidance to ¥2.6bn and announced a ¥650m buyback, so the share price had not yet reacted to the news. The stock is now about one-third below its December-2024 peak. On the revised guidance the operating business trades at roughly 5.5x forward EV/OP, after netting out its cash and deposits. The FY10/26 outcome depends on one question: is this only a timing trough, or is Gakujo becoming a slower-growth business that deserves a lower valuation?
What investors disagree about
Guidance, investment returns, and the cash balance explain the low valuation.
Gakujo books revenue when a job listing goes live or a placement closes, not when the order is won. So an order taken in the 1H can land in the second. What matters is whether the shortfall is only revenue being recognized later, or real demand fading.
- The cut mainly reflects timing and deliberate restraint. First-half orders rose 11.2% while revenue rose 5.8%, so customers are still placing work. Management says it is pacing delivery to protect service quality at the current headcount.
- This is a deep cut — full-year OP guidance fell 20% just six months after it was set.
- Re-Shukatsu, the core product and supposed growth engine, shrank 7.2%.
- OP margin has fallen for two straight reporting periods.
Promotion and system spending is expensed as it happens, so it lowers margin now. The bet is that it builds a member base and brand that should generate revenue later. What matters is whether that payoff is arriving, or whether the spend is really the cost of standing still.
- The leading indicators are still growing. Re-Shukatsu has 2.8 million members, and AI-led direct recruiting grew 55%. Because the business needs little capital, higher revenue can produce strong incremental returns once the current spending begins to convert.
- The spending has not yet produced visible growth: OP margin fell from 24.8% to 21.2%, with guidance at 21.7%, while revenue has not accelerated.
- Management itself caps growth at a 422-person headcount, so the model may not scale without eroding either quality or margin.
At 5.5x EV/OP, the multiple already uses depressed profit. Promotion and system spending have held margins down, while headline EV ignores ¥4.8bn of investment securities. If margins recover toward FY10/24's 24.8% and the full ¥11.3bn of cash and securities is treated as cash-like, the multiple falls toward 3x. What matters is whether that recovery is reasonable.
- The valuation may also omit ¥1.5–2.2bn of value in Gakujo's Osaka headquarters land above book value.
- That is hard to justify unless the franchise is shrinking.
- A return to FY10/24 margins is possible but not yet visible, which gives the low valuation a reason to persist.
- Cash, securities and land matter only if management uses them or returns them to shareholders.
- A low multiple can stay low if profit keeps falling and assets stay idle.
Capital-Efficiency Levers
Management can address the discount without waiting for faster growth.
- The clearest fix is to turn existing orders into revenue, not to spend more.
- Order intake grew 11.2% YoY while revenue grew 5.8% YoY, so the 2H should recognize work already booked.
- What matters now is whether 2H revenue converts the order book and Re-Shukatsu turns positive at the FY10/26 results in December.
- Because that spending is expensed immediately while the member base and brand it builds monetize later, margins will show whether the spending is creating growth or only maintaining the current business.
- The business is capital-light, so a margin that rebuilds toward the mid-twenties on flat or rising revenue would re-rate the operating multiple.
- Because the business needs little capital to grow, a larger or standing buyback, cancelling the 13.7% treasury, or a stated payout policy would lift ROE toward that ROCE and help investors treat capital returns as policy, not a one-off decision.
Scenario Pathways
The cases start from ¥1,547 and revised FY10/26 guidance.
Even here, ¥842 a share of net cash and five straight dividend increases cushion the floor.
The valuation improves only if investors give full value to the cash and to price the operating business like the high-return, capital-light franchise its returns suggest.
This is not investment advice.
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