J|I Japan Investor Interface · Compounder Profile
TSE STANDARD · 2477 · FY end JUN 手間いらず株式会社

Temairazu, Inc.

Subscription software that lets hotels manage every booking site from one screen
Last Close
¥2,314Jul 10, 2026
−41% from Aug-24 peak · 9% above the two-year low
Market Cap / EV
¥13.9bn / ¥7.5bn EV
net cash ¥6.4bn (46% of cap) · zero debt · ex-treasury basis
EV / OP · forward
4.6x
vs domestic peers ~18–39x · FY6/26E OP ¥1.64bn
ROCE · trailing
26%
ROE 16% · ex-cash the operating returns are triple-digit
OP Margin · group
73% · grp
FY06/25 73.6% · FY6/26E guide 69% · ~41 employees
Shares & Float
6.48M sh · ~24% float
founder/68k ~62% · treasury 7.5% · Hikari 6.7%
INTRODUCTION

What does Temairazu do?

Temairazu provides TEMAIRAZU, software used by hotels and ryokan to manage room inventory and prices across multiple booking channels from one screen. Those channels include online travel agencies such as Rakuten Travel, Jalan, and Booking.com, as well as the property's own website.

Customers pay mainly through monthly fees. About three-quarters of revenue comes from fixed monthly charges, including the base fee and optional services. The rest comes from variable fees linked to reservation volume. This means the business has a recurring subscription base, with an additional revenue layer that rises when customer booking volume increases.

The product matters because it sits inside the hotel's daily sales process. Once a property uses TEMAIRAZU to manage many booking channels, switching systems would create operational risk. That keeps churn low and lets new customer additions build on the existing revenue base.

The economics are unusual. In FY06/25, Temairazu generated ¥2.19bn of revenue and ¥1.61bn of OP, a 73% OP margin. The company has roughly 41 employees, no manufacturing assets, and very little capital required to run the business, so most OP turns into cash. Reported ROE is only 16%, mainly because the large cash balance lowers it; returns on the operating capital actually required by the business appear to be much higher.

The stock does not reflect that quality. At ¥2,146 on June 5, 2026, the shares traded at about 4.6x forward EV/OP, while net cash was equal to roughly 46% of the market value. The valuation question is why the market is applying such a low multiple to a business with recurring revenue, high margins, and a large net cash balance.

01 · PRICE REGIME

What has driven the stock over the past two years?

Earnings rose while the valuation multiple fell sharply.

2477 vs TOPIX · 24 months · daily candles + volume
Peak ¥3,950 · 2024-08-01 Trough ¥2,120 · 2026-06-03 Today ¥2,314
Temairazu · daily candles 60-day SMA TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · When investors still paid for the tourism-growth story Through the summer of 2024 the shares traded around ¥3,500–3,950, reaching ¥3,950 on August 1, 2024. FY06/24 had just delivered revenue up 11.9% YoY and OP up 10.9% YoY, and inbound demand was at record levels. At the peak the operating business was valued in the low-teens on EV/OP — already modest for a business with 73% margins, but investors were still willing to pay for the record-tourism growth story and expected management to return more of the cash balance to shareholders.

02 · When the multiple fell despite record profit From August 2024 the shares fell for twenty-two months to a two-year low of ¥2,120 on June 3, 2026. OP continued to reach new highs, so the share-price decline came mainly from the valuation multiple. Small-cap and growth stocks were sold across Tokyo; investors questioned how much of the variable, reservation-linked revenue was cyclical; and the limited free float near 24% meant there were not enough natural buyers when holders sold.

03 · When management began returning more cash As the share price fell, management increased buyback activity. A ¥800mn program authorized in September 2025 bought its full 260,000-share cap for ¥793mn by May 2026, and the dividend rose from ¥34 to ¥38. The share price remained weak, but management had started to return cash instead of only letting it build on the balance sheet.

04 · Where the stock stands now The stock closed at ¥2,146 on Friday, June 5, 2026, near its two-year low, and traded at about 4.6x forward EV/OP, with net cash worth 46% of the market value. After the close that day the company announced a new buyback of up to 130,000 shares — about 2.2% of shares outstanding excluding treasury — capped at ¥300mn, with purchases running from June 8 to October 30.

02 · CONTENTION

What investors disagree about

Growth runway, cash use, and the low multiple define the debate.

DEBATE 01 · VALUATION
Why is the operating business valued so cheaply?

EV/OP looks at the operating business after removing net cash; it strips out the ¥6.4bn of net cash. So 4.6x is the market's price for the TEMAIRAZU operating business alone — what matters is whether that price reflects the quality of the business or a discount for founder control and limited liquidity.

BULL
  • The valuation has fallen while OP reached a record. About 75% of revenue recurs, churn remains low, and buybacks retire more shares when the price is depressed.
BEAR
  • The low multiple may persist. The free float is only ~24%, the founder controls ~62% through 68k Inc. and his own holding, and no growth source beyond the domestic hotel base has been disclosed.
DEBATE 02 · GROWTH
How much growth is left in the domestic hotel market?

Fixed revenue grows as Temairazu signs net-new properties and raises the fee per property; variable revenue rises with reservation volume. Both depend on how many accommodation facilities in Japan can still be added, and on the inbound-tourism cycle.

BULL
  • Record inbound tourism and hotel labor shortages both increase the value of booking automation. Fixed revenue growth around 8% would show that Temairazu can keep raising revenue per property even as the domestic hotel count matures.
BEAR
  • The domestic customer base may be getting harder to expand, and management has not disclosed an overseas or adjacent growth engine. If FY06/26 OP merely meets the 1.9% growth guide, the slowdown will look structural rather than temporary.
DEBATE 03 · CAPITAL ALLOCATION
What will management do with the cash?

Net cash of ¥6.4bn is about 46% of the market value and appears to earn little return, pulling reported ROE down to 16% and ROCE to 26%. Investors are likely to value the company differently depending on whether that cash is returned, invested, or left idle.

BULL
  • Management has started to return cash while the share price is low.
  • Two buybacks in a year — ¥793mn completed and ¥300mn just launched — plus a dividend guided up to ¥40 show intent, and every share bought near a two-year low raises per-share value.
BEAR
  • The buybacks are still too small to reduce the cash balance meaningfully.
  • At ¥0.3–0.8bn a year against ¥6.4bn of cash and about ¥1bn of annual generation, the cash balance can continue to rise, and the company has returned cash without committing to a payout framework or a target balance.
03 · CATALYST

Capital-Efficiency Levers

Management can remove much of the discount without faster earnings growth.

LEVER 01 · CAPITAL POLICY
Set a clear policy for the ¥6.4bn cash balance
Cash vs capital returned (¥bn)
Net cash
¥6.4bn
Annual cash gen.
~¥1.0bn
Prior buyback
¥0.79bn
New buyback
¥0.30bn
buybacks so far are small compared with both the cash balance and annual cash generation
  • Net cash equals about 46% of market value and earns little. A credible plan to reduce it would give shareholders more of the value already on the balance sheet. FY06/26 results are the next opportunity for management to state a capital-return policy.
What it takes
One board resolution
When it could happen
FY06/26 results · Aug 2026
LEVER 02 · DISCLOSURE
Disclose property count, revenue per property, and churn
The operating metrics investors cannot currently see
Fixed-revenue mix
~75%
Property count
undisclosed
Revenue / property
undisclosed
Churn rate
"low" · no figure
the company says the recurring base is durable, but discloses no metrics to verify it
  • The company says churn is low and the fixed base grows, but does not disclose the property count, the revenue per property, or a churn number.
  • A single quarterly slide showing properties and revenue per property would let investors verify the recurring revenue base and reduce the discount caused by limited disclosure.
What it takes
One slide per quarter
When it could happen
1Q FY06/27 · Nov 2026
LEVER 03 · REVENUE
Increase revenue per property by selling automation and revenue-management functions
Revenue mix · 9M FY06/26
Monthly fixed
~75%
Monthly variable
~23%
Automation / RMS up-sell
growing
Internet media
~0.5%
automation and revenue-management tools can raise monthly fees without adding much cost
  • The lowest-cost growth path is to earn more from existing customers.
  • Because the cost base is near-fixed, much of the additional revenue could flow through to OP; combined with variable fees that rise with reservation volume, this is how revenue can keep growing even where the domestic property count is limited.
What it takes
Product investment (expensed)
When it could happen
Each quarterly release
04 · VALUATION

Scenario Pathways

The cases start from ¥2,314 and FY06/26 OP guidance.

BEAR SCENARIO
¥1,800 – ¥2,100
−16% to −2%
implied multiple · ~4–5x EV/OP (fwd)
In the bear case, the market continues to treat Temairazu as a value trap: the multiple stays at ~4–5x, the cash continues to earn little return, and a discount for founder control and limited free float remains.

Even in this case, net cash limits the downside to some extent: it is worth ~46% of the current market value, a large cash balance that would matter in any strategic valuation.

BASE SCENARIO
¥2,500 – ¥3,100
+16% to +44%
implied multiple · ~7–9x EV/OP (fwd)
The multiple moves closer to peer multiples, but does not fully close the gap, as buybacks reduce the share count and management delivers one clear improvement — better disclosure or a clearer payout policy.
BULL SCENARIO
¥3,400 – ¥3,900
+58% to +82%
implied multiple · ~9–11x EV/OP (fwd)
Management delivers two of the three changes above — a stated capital-return policy plus better operating disclosure — and investors assign a multiple closer to businesses with similar margins and recurring revenue, though still below the lowest-multiple SaaS peer.

The bull band stays just under the ¥3,950 August-2024 high. The implied fundamental value could be higher: the sum-of-parts below points to ¥3,300–4,600 if investors give most of the cash balance full value.

SUM-OF-PARTS · OPERATING BUSINESS
TEMAIRAZU booking site controller — ~99.5% of revenue
FY6/26E OP¥1,640M
FY6/26E revenue · growth¥2,365M · +8.2%
OP margin~69% (FY06/25 73.6%)
Recurring mix~75% monthly fixed
Assumed EV / OP9–13x
Implied operating EV ~¥14.8–21.3bn at 9–13x — still below domestic peers at ~18–39x.
SUM-OF-PARTS · NET CASH + MEDIA
Cash and deposits, zero debt; plus the legacy Hikaku.com internet-media business
Net cash (3Q FY06/26)¥6,393M
Interest-bearing debt¥0
Net cash / market cap46%
Internet media (Hikaku.com)~¥0 · immaterial
Allocation discount applied10–20%
Cash counted at ~¥5.1–6.4bn — a haircut for cash held under ~62% founder control; JII assigns no value to the media business.
PEER MULTIPLE LADDER · trailing EV / OP
Domestic software & internet platforms (EDINET filings, latest annual OP · live EV at 2026-07-10 close)
Kakaku.com (2371)~25x · OPM 29%
HENNGE (4475)~18x · OPM 16%
Rakus (3923)~20x · OPM 29%
Infomart (2492)~39x · OPM 15%
Temairazu (2477)~4.6x · OPM 73%
Temairazu is the cheapest and the highest-margin; tripla (5136) is excluded because client funds on its balance sheet distort EV, making EV/OP less useful.
EQUITY BRIDGE · implied value per share
Operating EV + net cash, divided by ex-treasury shares
Operating EV (9–13x FY6/26E OP)¥14.8–21.3bn
+ Net cash (after discount)¥5.1–6.4bn
= Implied equity value¥19.9–27.7bn
÷ ex-treasury shares5,995,073
= Implied value per share¥3,320–4,620
vs ¥2,314 close+43% to +100%
The mid-case is about ¥3,840 per share. Buybacks would raise the implied value if they reduce the share count below this assumption.
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