What does Loadstar Capital do?
Loadstar Capital buys office buildings in central Tokyo and fixes what is wrong with them. It looks for mid-size buildings that most buyers price down because something about them is hard. One is half empty. Another has been managed poorly for years, so its tenants pay less than the space is worth. A third carries ownership rights that someone has to untangle before any work can start. Loadstar employs certified real-estate appraisers and licensed transaction specialists itself, so it can form its own view on a building in-house and give a broker an answer quickly. It buys with its own money and bank debt, refurbishes, fills the building with tenants, raises rents toward the market level, and sells. In FY2025 that one activity produced ¥34,228mn of the company's ¥44,633mn of revenue.
The buildings Loadstar owns at any one moment, waiting to be repaired or sold, are its property book. Four smaller businesses sit alongside that book. The buildings Loadstar still owns pay rent, which brought in ¥3,525mn in FY2025. Six resort hotels under the HIRAMATSU HOTELS name, run under contract by Hiramatsu Inc., brought in ¥4,261mn. An asset-management arm invests in Tokyo property for institutions that cannot source it themselves and earned ¥1,763mn on assets under management of more than ¥120bn at 2026-03-31. OwnersBook, which Loadstar started in 2014 as Japan's first crowdfunding platform for real estate, lets individuals put in from ¥10,000 a ticket and earned ¥829mn.
FY2025 revenue rose 29.7% to ¥44,633mn and OP rose to ¥13,415mn, a 30.1% operating margin. ROCE was 13.7% in FY2025, on capital employed averaged across the FY2024 and FY2025 year ends. Loadstar paid a weighted average 1.93% on the money it borrowed that year. Loadstar earns 13.7% on the capital it puts into buildings and pays 1.93% for the money it borrows to buy them. Every building it holds therefore earns more than it costs to fund, and that difference is where the profit comes from. Keeping that difference open costs money, because Loadstar has to own each building while it works on it. At 2026-03-31 it carried ¥99,122mn of buildings in inventory. It had borrowed ¥76,252mn and held ¥13,276mn of cash. Equity was 26.6% of total assets.
The stock closed at ¥2,750 on July 22, 2026. Loadstar’s reported book value is ¥1,720 a share, so on that measure the market pays 1.60x. But the buildings are carried at cost, never at market value. The reason is an accounting one. Loadstar’s auditor requires every building to be recorded in the inventory line called real estate for sale, whatever the company intends to do with it. Buildings held as inventory are never restated to their market value. So an increase in what a building is worth never appears in the accounts while Loadstar still owns it. The gain becomes real only when a building is sold. What Loadstar does disclose is an equity ratio that includes the after-tax unrealized gain on the buildings: 39.3% at 2026-03-31, against 39.1% at the FY2025 year end. The company does not publish the gain itself in the quarterly accounts, so JII worked it out from that one ratio. Equity was ¥34,912mn and total assets ¥131,117mn. The amount that has to be added to both to make equity 39.3% of assets is about ¥27.4bn after tax. Adding it to equity gives an adjusted book value of about ¥3,069 a share. The stock trades at about nine tenths of a book value that already counts the gain. How did the price get here? What are investors arguing about? What is changing in who owns Loadstar, who buys its buildings, and what protects it? Which disclosures would change what investors pay for the profit? And what is the whole business worth?
What has driven the stock over the past two years?
Loadstar Capital buys mid-size office buildings in central Tokyo that other bidders avoid because they are half empty, badly managed, or carry tangled ownership rights. It refurbishes them, fills them with tenants, and sells them, so it earns the difference between purchase and sale price plus the rent collected in between.
01 · The climb to March 2026 Loadstar grew revenue 23.6% a year over the three years to FY2025. Profit rose faster than the share price did. So the stock was getting cheaper measured against its own earnings even while it climbed: buyers were not raising the multiple they paid as fast as Loadstar was raising the profit. On February 13, 2026, after the market closed, the company reported FY2025 revenue up 29.7% to ¥44,633mn and OP of ¥13,415mn, then guided FY2026 revenue up 25.8% and OP up 19.1%. The stock kept rising over the following weeks and reached ¥3,158 on March 2, 2026.
02 · The fall to June On April 30, 2026, after the close, Loadstar reported Q1 revenue up 65.2% to ¥18,261mn and OP up only 10.2%. The next trading day began a decline that ran to ¥2,248 on June 4. Revenue rose far faster than profit that quarter, and there is a specific reason for it. In Q1 FY2025 Loadstar had sold one building at a 60.0% gross margin, the highest quarterly property margin it has ever recorded. In Q1 FY2026 it sold a larger building at 36.6%. So investors were comparing a good quarter against a record one. At the same time the Bank of Japan was raising interest rates, and Loadstar was paying those rates on its borrowings.
03 · The June decisions On June 12, 2026, after the close, the board resolved to give shareholders 0.2 shares for every share held. The shares came out of the block Loadstar had bought back over the years and held itself, which was 21.13% of shares outstanding at May 31. The board separately held the year-end dividend forecast at ¥98 on the enlarged share count. On June 25 the board resolved to sell a Shinagawa-ku office for more than 10% of FY2025 revenue, handing it over on June 30. The stock recovered through late June and July.
04 · Where the stock stands now At ¥2,750 investors value the equity at ¥55.8bn and the enterprise at ¥118.8bn, which is 7.4x the company's own FY2026 OP guidance of ¥15,976mn. Management left that guidance unchanged after Q1. An even pace would put a quarter of the year’s revenue in the first quarter. Q1 delivered 32.5%, so Loadstar is running ahead of that pace. The forecast dividend of ¥98 gives a 3.56% yield at this price. Two things have not yet been tested: the first security-token offering, which opens on August 1, 2026, and the eventual resale of GINZA PREX East, the largest building Loadstar has ever bought, which it acquired in March 2026.
Live Investor Debates
Three debates explain why a company earning 13.7% on capital trades at 7.4x its own forward operating-profit guidance and at nine tenths of an adjusted book value. Each one turns on a figure Loadstar has to publish between now and its FY2027 results.
Loadstar earns 13.7% on the capital it employs and pays 1.93% on the money it borrows to employ it. The whole business is that gap. The Bank of Japan is raising rates and most of Loadstar's debt is floating, so the cost side moves first. The debate is whether rents and building prices rise faster.
The medium-term plan runs to FY2027 and asks the property book to grow from ¥81.5bn at FY2024 to ¥150.0bn. It stood at ¥99.1bn at 2026-03-31. Loadstar added ¥11.0bn in FY2025, so the remaining climb needs about ¥29bn a year for seven quarters. The debate is what the marginal building earns.
In December 2025 Loadstar bought Hash DasH Holdings, which came with a Type-1 financial-instruments license and a blockchain platform. That license lets the group sell securities backed by its own buildings without paying an intermediary. Loadstar recorded about ¥1.06bn of goodwill for it and guided SG&A up 41.0%. Nothing has been sold yet.
What is changing in who owns it, who buys from it, and the edge?
Every holder received 0.2 shares for each share held, taken out of treasury. Nobody's proportional claim changed and no new shares were issued, so the allotment moved no value at all; per-share figures simply restate onto 20,293,078 shares instead of 16,910,899. What did move value is the separate decision to hold the ¥98 dividend on the larger count, which lifts the cash paid out by about 20% and the payout ratio from 18.0% to 21.7%. Next check: how many of the 1,150,922 shares still in treasury are reserved for compensation, and whether the rest is canceled.
Capital Generation K.K. cut its stake from 6.64% to 4.96% of shares outstanding excluding treasury during FY2025, about a quarter of what it held, and gave no reason. Tatsushi Iwano, who founded the company in 2012 and still runs it, held 3,429,000 shares at the year end, 20.36%, and did not sell. The FY2024 figures come from the shareholder table in that year’s annual report. Next check: whether Capital Generation appears in the FY2026 register at all.
Sumitomo Mitsui DS Asset Management filed a large-holding report for 1,078k shares, or 5.03%, as of that date. Loadstar could not confirm the beneficial owner at December 31 and left the firm out of its top-ten table, so the published register understates institutional ownership by roughly that much. Three trust-bank accounts hold about 15.8% of shares outstanding excluding treasury. A trust bank holds shares on behalf of pension funds and other institutions, so the names behind those accounts are not disclosed. Foreign investors hold 12.11% of the shares. The top ten holders together hold 51.79%. Next check: whether the FY2026 annual report brings the firm into the table.
The three largest buyers in FY2025 were Ichigo Jisho at ¥8,800mn, Wellness 21 LLC at ¥7,500mn and JR West Real Estate Development at ¥6,380mn, together 50.8% of revenue. In FY2024 the three largest were Sanshin, Fukuhara and Shimizu, together 48.6%. Not one FY2024 name appears in FY2025. None of them is a customer in the ordinary sense. Each one bought a single building, once. Loadstar has no continuing commercial relationship with any of them afterwards. The relationship that repeats is with the brokers who bring Loadstar the deals first, and the company names none of them. Next check: any buyer appearing in two consecutive years.
Loadstar completed the purchase of GINZA PREX East, the largest building it has ever bought: a 2024-built, partly fitted-out office on a corner site in Tsukiji, Chuo-ku, from Sumitomo Corporation's PREX series. Loadstar learned what it is good at on smaller buildings: deciding quickly what one is worth, repairing it, filling it with tenants, and selling it. A larger building takes longer to fill and has fewer possible buyers at the exit. Next check: the gross margin and holding period when this one is sold.
Loadstar owns six HIRAMATSU HOTELS through six special-purpose companies and pays Hiramatsu Inc. to run them, because it does not claim hotel operating skill. FY2025 hotel revenue rose 157.4% to ¥4,261mn, but that compared a full year with a part year. Q1 FY2026 fell 3.5%, the first clean comparison and the only line going backwards. Loadstar carries the buildings and the debt while another company sets occupancy and room rates. Next check: hotel revenue growing again in the half-year results.
The gross margin Loadstar earns on the buildings it sells shows whether it is still buying them cheaply enough. That margin was 35.1% in FY2024, 31.8% in FY2025, and 36.6% in Q1 FY2026 on the largest sale in the company's history. The 60.0% recorded in Q1 FY2025 came from one exceptional building, and it is the only reason this year's quarter looks weak beside it. Measured against the FY2025 full-year average, the current quarter is the better one. Next check: full-year FY2026 property gross margin at or above 31.8%.
Subscriptions open on August 1 and close on August 27 for ¥3,830mn of tokens over the Chisun Hotel Yokohama Isezakicho, with operations starting August 28. Loadstar is selling 7,660 units at ¥500,000 each. The tokens run for roughly ten years and are expected to distribute about 4.1% a year, measured as total distributions divided by the amount raised. Loadstar borrowed nothing to buy the hotel, so the rent it collects is not shared with a lender. The business being upgraded is OwnersBook, the crowdfunding platform Loadstar launched in 2014: annual investment volume was ¥13.4bn in FY2024 against a ¥20.0bn FY2027 target. The plan describes that target as one the company is taking on a second time, having set it before and not reached it. Next check: whether a second offering follows.
Loadstar began the plan with ¥140.0bn under management at FY2024 and targets ¥300.0bn by FY2027. The figure fell to just over ¥110bn at the FY2025 year end, then recovered to more than ¥120bn at 2026-03-31 on new mandates; both figures are the company’s own, one for each date. Fee revenue still rose 47.9% in FY2025. Loadstar earns two kinds of fee: a management fee charged every year on the assets it looks after, and a one-off fee each time it buys or sells a building for a client. Assets fell while fees rose, so the one-off fees are the likely reason, and those do not repeat. Next check: assets under management at the half-year.
Disclosure & Capital Levers
Three things Loadstar has not disclosed would change how an outside owner values it. What the newest building earns. What happens to the shares still held in treasury. Whether the asset-management arm is growing assets or only collecting fees.
Scenario Pathways
At the July 22, 2026 close, Loadstar trades at 7.4x forward EV/EBIT. The three scenarios below are JII estimates, not company guidance.
- Weighted average borrowing rate passes 2.5% during FY2027.
- FY2027 pre-tax margin stays below the 25% floor.
- The property book grows while ROCE falls under 13%.
- GINZA PREX East sells at a gross margin under 30%.
At ¥2,000 the market pays 1.16x reported book of ¥1,720 and 0.65x the unrealized-gain-adjusted book of ¥3,069.
- FY2026 revenue and OP guidance met without revision.
- Property gross margin holds near 31.8% for the full year.
- The ¥98 dividend is paid on the enlarged share count.
- Assets under management recover toward the ¥140.0bn starting point.
- FY2027 pre-tax profit reaches ¥16.7bn on a 25%-plus margin.
- GINZA PREX East sells above a 36% gross margin.
- A second security-token offering prices before FY2027.
- Assets under management climb past ¥200bn on new mandates.
At ¥3,800 the market pays 1.24x the adjusted book of ¥3,069, so buyers would be paying more than the buildings alone are worth, on the view that the fee and token businesses add value on top.
This is not investment advice.
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