LOADSTAR CAPITAL
Loadstar acquires mid-sized Tokyo office buildings left at low valuations because of poor occupancy, management or complex ownership rights, improves them through repairs and leasing, then rents and sells them. On July 1, 2026 it allotted 0.2 treasury shares per existing share without charge, expanding tradable shares and raising the dividend payout ratio to 21.7%.
Company
LOADSTAR CAPITAL
ロードスターキャピタル株式会社
Acquires mid-sized office buildings in central Tokyo, improves and leases them, then sells them.
- Last Close
- ¥2,750
- Jul 22, 2026 · −13% from the Mar-26 peak · +22% off the Jun-26 low
- Market Cap / enterprise value (EV)
- ¥55.8bn / ¥118.8bn EV
- net debt ¥63.0bn · 20.3M sh ex-treasury
- EV / OP · forward
- 7.4x
- on FY12/26 OP guidance ¥15,976mn · 8.9x on FY12/25 actual
- ROCE · trailing
- 13.7%
- 14.6% in FY12/24 · borrows at 1.93%
- P / B incl. unrealized gain
- 0.90x · 1.60x reported
- adjusted book ~¥3,069/sh · our estimate
- Shares & Float
- 20.3M sh · top-10 hold 51.8%
- founder-CEO 20.4% · 1.15M shares left in treasury
What does Loadstar Capital do?
Loadstar Capital buys mid-size office buildings in central Tokyo that other buyers avoid because they are partly empty, badly managed, or legally complicated. Its own appraisers and licensed real-estate specialists decide quickly what each problem is worth. Loadstar then buys the building with equity and bank debt, refurbishes it, fills vacant space, raises rent toward the market, and sells. This principal-investment business supplied ¥34,228mn of FY12/25 revenue of ¥44,633mn.
Four smaller businesses sit around the property book. Buildings awaiting sale produced ¥3,525mn of rent. Six resort hotels, operated under contract by Hiramatsu, produced ¥4,261mn. The asset-management arm earned ¥1,763mn while managing more than ¥120bn for institutional investors. OwnersBook, the real-estate crowdfunding service Loadstar started in 2014, earned ¥829mn from individual investments that begin at ¥10,000.
The model works while the return on each building stays well above the cost of its debt. FY12/25 revenue rose 29.7% to ¥44,633mn, OP reached ¥13,415mn, and ROCE was 13.7%. Loadstar paid an average 1.93% on its borrowings. At March 2026 it held ¥99,122mn of property inventory, funded with ¥76,252mn of debt and ¥13,276mn of cash. The balance sheet makes the shares look expensive at 1.6x book, but Japanese accounting keeps buildings at cost until sale. Loadstar estimates the unrealized gain at about ¥37.9bn before tax. Adding that gain after tax lifts adjusted book value to roughly ¥3,069 a share, above the July 22 close of ¥2,750. The stock therefore trades below the estimated value of the property already owned, but that value becomes cash only when Loadstar sells successfully and preserves the spread between property returns and funding costs.
What has driven the stock over the past two years?
Property gains, borrowing costs, and book growth drove the shares.
01 · The climb to March 2026 Loadstar grew revenue 23.6% a year over the three years to FY12/25. Profit rose faster than the share price did. So the stock was getting cheaper measured against its own earnings even while it climbed: buyers were not raising the multiple they paid as fast as Loadstar was raising the profit. On February 13, 2026, after the market closed, the company reported FY12/25 revenue up 29.7% YoY to ¥44,633mn and OP of ¥13,415mn, then guided FY12/26 revenue up 25.8% YoY and OP up 19.1% YoY.
02 · The fall to June On April 30, 2026, after the close, Loadstar reported 1Q revenue up 65.2% YoY to ¥18,261mn and OP up only 10.2%. The next trading day began a decline that ran to ¥2,248 on June 4. Revenue rose far faster than profit that quarter, and there is a specific reason for it. In 1Q FY12/25 Loadstar had sold one building at a 60.0% gross margin, the highest quarterly property margin it has ever recorded.
03 · The June decisions On June 12, 2026, after the close, the board resolved to give shareholders 0.2 shares for every share held. The shares came out of the block Loadstar had bought back over the years and held itself, which was 21.13% of shares outstanding at May 31. The board separately held the year-end dividend forecast at ¥98 on the enlarged share count. On June 25 the board resolved to sell a Shinagawa-ku office for more than 10% of FY12/25 revenue, handing it over on June 30. The stock recovered through late June and July.
04 · Where the stock stands now At ¥2,750 investors value the equity at ¥55.8bn and the enterprise at ¥118.8bn, which is 7.4x the company's own FY12/26 OP guidance of ¥15,976mn. Management left that guidance unchanged after 1Q. An even pace would put a quarter of the year’s revenue in the 1Q. 1Q delivered 32.5%, so Loadstar is running ahead of that pace. The forecast dividend of ¥98 gives a 3.56% yield at this price.
What investors disagree about
Funding spreads, property growth, and Hash DasH define the valuation.
Loadstar earns 13.7% on the capital it employs and pays 1.93% on the money it borrows to employ it. The whole business is that gap. The Bank of Japan is raising rates and most of Loadstar's debt is floating, so the cost side moves first. What matters is whether rents and building prices rise faster.
- Inflation has so far helped Loadstar more than it has cost it.
- Tokyo office rents and building prices have both been rising. Most of Loadstar’s debt is floating, so the cost side moves first when the Bank of Japan raises rates.
- The spread between what a building earns and what its debt costs is the whole business.
- The spread is already narrowing. ROCE slipped from 14.6% to 13.7% as borrowing costs rose. Loadstar borrows to buy, while buyers value buildings by the return on rent, so higher rates pressure both sides of each deal.
The medium-term plan runs to FY12/27 and asks the property book to grow from ¥81.5bn at FY12/24 to ¥150.0bn. It stood at ¥99.1bn at March 31, 2026. Loadstar added ¥11.0bn in FY12/25, so the remaining climb needs about ¥29bn a year for seven quarters. The debate is what the marginal building earns.
- A larger book produces more rent and gives Loadstar more freedom over when to sell. Rental revenue rose 20.6% to ¥3,525mn, moving the company toward its goal of covering fixed costs with rent alone.
- The plan requires a pre-tax margin of at least 25%. Loadstar is growing the book with more debt, but a larger balance sheet creates value only if profit per building also rises.
In December 2025 Loadstar bought Hash DasH Holdings, which came with a Type-1 financial-instruments license and a blockchain platform. That license lets the group sell securities backed by its own buildings without paying an intermediary. Loadstar recorded about ¥1.06bn of goodwill for it and guided SG&A up 41.0%. Nothing has been sold yet.
- Loadstar now controls the full chain: it supplies the property, structures the security token, sells it, and manages the underlying asset. Property companies usually lack the securities license, while securities firms lack the buildings.
- The first token offering uses a Yokohama hotel that Loadstar has owned through a trust since 2016. That proves the financing route works, but not yet that Hash DasH can win outside assets or repeat the economics.
Two things worth a diagram
Loadstar already owns the Chisun Hotel Yokohama. It is not selling the hotel to one buyer — it cuts the hotel’s trust into 7,660 tokens and sells those slices to many small investors.
Loadstar turns a building it owns into cash today without borrowing, and still earns the manager’s fee. It can run the whole chain — own the building, hold the securities license, issue the tokens, manage the asset — which a property firm or a securities firm cannot do alone. Token holders are buying the rental income, not the profit on an eventual sale.
The asset-management arm earns two fees. Only one of them compounds, and in FY12/25 the other one did the work.
What is changing in who owns it, who buys from it, and the edge?
- Every holder received 0.2 shares for each share held, taken out of treasury.
- No new shares were issued and nobody’s proportional claim changed, so the allotment itself moved no value; per-share figures simply restate onto 20,293,078 shares instead of 16,910,899.
- Founder Tatsushi Iwano, who started the company in 2012 and still runs it, held 20.4% at the year end and did not sell; the top ten hold 51.8%.
- The one mover was Capital Generation K.K., which cut its stake from 6.64% to 4.96%, about a quarter of its holding, and gave no reason.
- The three largest buyers in FY12/25 were Ichigo Jisho, Wellness 21 LLC and JR West Real Estate Development, together 50.8% of revenue; in FY12/24 the three largest were a different 48.6%.
- Not one FY12/24 name appears in FY12/25.
- Loadstar completed the purchase of GINZA PREX East, the largest building it has ever bought: a 2024-built, partly fitted-out office on a corner site in Tsukiji, Chuo-ku, from Sumitomo Corporation’s PREX series.
- Loadstar learned its trade on smaller buildings — value one quickly, repair it, fill it with tenants, sell it.
- The gross margin Loadstar earns on the buildings it sells shows whether it is still buying them cheaply enough.
- That margin was 35.1% in FY12/24, 31.8% in FY12/25, and 36.6% in 1Q FY12/26 on the largest sale in the company’s history.
- Subscriptions open on August 1 for ¥3,830mn of tokens over the 399-room Chisun Hotel Yokohama, an asset Loadstar has owned since 2016.
- It upgrades OwnersBook, the crowdfunding platform Loadstar started in 2014.
Disclosure & Capital Levers
Three missing disclosures would make Loadstar easier to value.
- Loadstar's plan takes the property book from ¥81.5bn to ¥150.0bn, and every yen of that is a decision to buy one more building.
- A table of realized gross margin and holding period by year of purchase would cost management one page, and it would let an outsider judge the marginal deal against the 1.93% Loadstar pays for the money.
- The block left over is still 5.4% of shares outstanding, and the company has said only that it will be used for stock-option exercise and restricted-stock grants, with no amount and no date attached.
- The disclosure that is missing is a dated policy: how much is kept for compensation, and how much is canceled.
- The asset-management arm earns two kinds of fee: a recurring management fee on the assets it runs, and a one-off fee each time it trades a building for a client.
- Assets under management fell from ¥140bn toward ¥120bn.
- Reporting the two fee types separately would show an owner which half actually compounds.
Scenario Pathways
The cases start from 7.4x forward EV/OP.
At ¥2,000 the market pays 1.16x reported book of ¥1,720 and 0.65x the unrealized-gain-adjusted book of ¥3,069.
At ¥3,800 the market pays 1.24x the adjusted book of ¥3,069, so buyers would be paying more than the buildings alone are worth, on the view that the fee and token businesses add value on top.
This is not investment advice.
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