Cybozu, Inc.
Cybozu provides kintone, a no-code platform used by 39,000 Japanese companies to build internal business apps. FY25 price revisions increased profit sharply, but costs also rose. Watch whether that profit level holds and whether May’s ¥3bn buyback becomes a formal, continuing capital-return policy.
Company
Cybozu, Inc.
サイボウズ株式会社
Cloud software for internal information sharing and building business apps without code.
- Last Close
- ¥2,197
- May 13, 2026 · −47% from Aug-25 peak · +12% off Apr floor
- Market Cap / enterprise value (EV)
- ¥102bn / ¥94bn EV
- net cash ¥8bn (8% of cap) · ¥3bn buyback announced May 14
- EV / OP · forward
- 8.9x
- vs Aug-25 peak ~30x · peer median ~12x · strict pass
- ROCE · trailing
- 68%
- FY12/23 42% → FY12/25 68% · price-revision step-up
- OP Margin · group
- 27% · grp
- FY12/26 guide 25% · 1Q FY12/26 actual 29% (ahead of pace)
- Shares Outstanding
- 46.2M sh
- treasury 12.3% · May-14 buyback retires up to 6.5% of OS
What moved the share price over the past two years?
Cybozu stock rose from about ¥1,600 in May 2024 to ¥4,150 in August 2025, but lost most of its gains over the next eight months. The focus will be on how to evaluate the FY26 plan announced in December 2025, the impairment loss of the US subsidiary in February 2026, and the Q1 financial results and share buyback announced after the close of trading on May 14th.
01 · The rally Cybozu was long known in Japan for Cybozu Office and Garoon groupware. Its no-code business app platform kintone changed investors’ assessment in recent years. By December 2025, about 39,000 companies used it, versus 37,000 a year earlier, including many Prime Market companies. About two-thirds of domestic cloud sales come through 560 partners that handle implementation and configuration. Cybozu itself earns recurring software fees, a structure conducive to SaaS margins.
The reason why the stock price rose from 2024 to 2025 is simple: kintone's unit price rose significantly, which was directly linked to profits. NRR in FY25 is 121.9%, monthly churn rate is less than 1%. Due to price revisions and an increase in the minimum number of contract users, kintone's ARPA has increased from ¥34,100 in FY23 to ¥47,100 in FY25, 38% in two years It has risen (+52% in 4 years from ¥30,900 in FY21). In FY24 final results, sales +16.7%, operating income +44.1%. In FY25, sales +26.1% and operating profit +106.4% are in sight, confirming that price increases will boost not only sales but operating profit. The high price ¥4,150 on August 19, 2025 was approximately 30x EV/EBIT for the next 12 months, and the market was evaluating it on the assumption that this profit level would continue to some extent.
02 · The reversal The December 18, 2025 FY26 plan changed the trend. Guidance was for sales growth of 12.7% and OP growth of 4.1%, weak after OP had doubled the previous year and insufficient to sustain the valuation. Management cited investment toward FY28 sales of ¥50.9bn, special employee bonuses, advertising up 28%, R&D up 34%, and Ehime Sports Entertainment consolidation. Investors were more concerned about repeatability of FY24–25 ARPA growth than the costs themselves. The contributions of pricing, user growth within existing customers and migration to broader plans were not disclosed separately, making it hard to extrapolate FY25’s high incremental margin.
In addition, February 9, 2026 includes the US subsidiary Kintone Corporation (CYBOZU in August 2011) ¥1.485bn was announced in the individual financial statements regarding the loss on valuation of affiliated company stocks (established as CORPORATION, changed to current company name in 2016). The subsidiary was ¥0.355bn in excess of its debts at the end of FY25. The company has indicated that it will continue to invest in its U.S. operations, but it has not fully indicated how much capital it will spend in total, and when and at what level it will decide to pay it back. Given the high capital efficiency of domestic Kintone, the discipline of capital invested in the United States became a major issue for the market. The stock price fell to on April 13, 2026 to ¥1,965, and the decline rate from the high price reached 53%.
03 · Current position Q1 FY26 results released after the close on May 14, 2026 improved the post-adjustment outlook. Sales were ¥10.246bn (+17.0%), OP ¥3.014bn (+15.3%) and net profit ¥2.191bn (+21.6%). Even after higher advertising and R&D and Ehime Sports costs, the 29.4% OP margin exceeded full-year guidance of 24.9%. The same day brought a buyback of up to ¥3bn and three million shares. With the ¥50 annual dividend, FY26 returns would total about ¥5.3bn, around 71% of guided net profit. The market’s questions are whether ARPA growth is sustainable, whether the US business can recover, and whether buybacks become a continuing capital policy.
Three questions dividing investor views
The decline in's stock price is difficult to explain solely by deteriorating business results. Investors are trying to determine three things: whether a company can grow profits even after price increases, whether it can properly manage overseas investments, and whether it will continue to provide shareholder returns.
Three points to pay attention to in IR and capital policy
Even if profits don't suddenly increase, evaluations can change if investors can make a decision. In Cybozu's case, the priorities are clear.
Scenarios for the next four quarters
The following is not a prediction, but a scenario to organize which factors stock prices are likely to react to.
- FY26 full-year operating profit exceeded company plan¥10.5bnLanding forward or backward or downward.
- An additional valuation loss was incurred for Kintone Corporation in the FY26 financial results.
- Regarding Ehime Arena¥3bn superThe financial burden is visible, and external funding and demarcation of responsibilities are not indicated.
- There is no disclosure of ARPA breakdown, nor is there a second share buyback or return policy.
- Domestic kintone's NRR is115%This shows that growth has slowed down after the price increase.
The expected EV/EBIT for this range is approximately 5.8–7.0x, which is below the lower limit of 7–10x that is seen when taking domestic software companies private. This is a downside price when there is strong distrust in capital allocation rather than the value of the business itself.
- Full-year operating profit in Q2 or Q3 FY26¥11bn superRevised upward to.
- The breakdown and trends of kintone ARPA are shown in the interim or full-year financial results.
- 5/15–7/31's share buyback quota has been steadily used, and the company has mentioned its return policy from next time onwards.
- There was no additional impairment loss for Kintone Corporation, and U.S. sales grew.+30%The above is confirmed.
- ARPA's detailed disclosure confirms that usage expansion and migration to higher-tier plans are continuing beyond price increases.
- The concept of capital allocation, such as the total return ratio and stock buyback standards, will be clearly stated.
- Kintone Corporation's cumulative invested capital, timing of profitability, and review criteria for non-achievement will be disclosed.
- FY26 full-year operating profit¥11.5bnThe above results confirm that profit growth will continue even after the cost increase.
- Ehime Arena-related matters will be reorganized using external funds and sponsors in a manner that does not impair capital efficiency as a listed SaaS company.
bull case is below the August 2025 high of ¥4,150. In order to return to around 30 times the peak level, in addition to re-accelerating domestic ARPA, it is necessary to drastically change the way we view the US/APAC business, which is difficult to factor in in just the next four quarters.
This material is not investment advice.
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