J|I Japan Investor Interface · Compounder Profile
TSE STANDARD · 6037 · FY end JUL 楽待株式会社
Rakumachi, Inc.
Real Estate Investment Portal · Rakumachi · Brokerage-subscription marketplace
Last Close
¥977May 26, 2026
−35% from Sep-25 peak · +99% off May-24 trough
Market Cap / EV
¥19.2bn / ¥18.0bn EV
operating net cash ¥1.2bn (6% of cap) · plus ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio (separate non-operating reserve) · zero borrowings
EV / EBIT · forward
10.0x
trailing 11.6x · JP listed digital-marketplace peer median ~6.7x · premium justified by 48.9% OPM
ROCE · trailing
28% · 3yr trend
FY7/23 24.3% → FY7/24 20.1% → FY7/25 28.2% · re-expanding
Operating margin · group
48.9% · FY7/25
H1 FY7/26 55.3% · FY7/26 guide 51.4% · single-segment portal
Shares & Float
19.6M sh · ex-treasury
Sakaguchi family 68.2% · VIS Advisors 5.1% · 850k of buybacks authorized FY7/26
01 · REGIME

Price Action · 24 Months

Rakumachi sells monthly listing subscriptions to Japanese real-estate brokerages that want to put income-producing properties — rental apartments, parking lots, small commercial buildings — in front of individual investors looking to buy them. It earns that audience for free by ranking organically in Japanese-language searches for income-producing real estate, and by running a YouTube channel of teaching videos for first-time landlords that crossed one billion cumulative views in late 2025.

6037 vs TOPIX · 24 months · daily candles + volume
Peak ¥1,493 · 2025-09-16 Trough ¥492 · 2024-05-16 Today ¥977
Rakumachi · daily candles 60-day SMA TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · THE RALLY Rakumachi runs one product: the rakumachi.co.jp portal. As of January 2026, 487,000 individual investors use the site for free, and 5,459 brokerage agencies pay a monthly fee to list their income-producing properties on it. Three smaller revenue lines sit on top: a patented proposal feature that pushes off-market listings to investors who have told the site what they are looking for; a Premium subscription with extra tools (ARPU +17% YoY in H1 FY7/26); and tie-up video ads sold to property managers and financial institutions. OPM is high for two reasons. First, customer acquisition costs almost nothing — members find the site through twenty years of Japanese-search ranking and a YouTube channel that passed one billion cumulative views in late 2025. Second, the Premium subscription and the tie-up videos have pricing room. Outside the operating business sits a separate ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio (held to maturity, 5.5% average coupon, generating about ¥114M of interest income each H1). That interest lands below the operating line, so it does not lift OPM. And each yen invested in those bonds earns about a fifth of what the same yen would earn redeployed in the core business — so the portfolio is a drag on overall returns, not a tailwind, until management uses the cash for buybacks. The stock rose 3x from ¥492 on May 16, 2024 to ¥1,493 on September 16, 2025 on three disclosures. The FY7/24 annual results in September 2024 showed revenue up 13% to ¥2.36bn with OPM at 44.9%, and the company moved ¥4.17bn of cash into the new US-dollar bond portfolio. The FY7/25 annual results on September 12, 2025 showed revenue up 33.6% to ¥3.16bn and OP up 45.6% to ¥1.55bn, with OPM at 48.9%. The same day, the company announced founder Naohiro Sakaguchi's succession by Ryo Fujie, the head of marketing, plus a fourth buyback in twelve months of up to 500,000 shares and ¥750M.

02 · THE CONSOLIDATION From the September 2025 peak the stock fell by about a third over the next eight months, reaching ¥990 on March 13, 2026. The business itself kept doing well during this period. At the October 2025 annual shareholders' meeting, the board expanded from four directors to seven, adding two long-tenure department heads as inside members. The founder kept his 68.2% holding; what changed was that day-to-day operations now had more people between him and the next decision. The Q1 FY7/26 results in December 2025 and the H1 FY7/26 results in March 2026 each showed OP up 43.4% YoY on revenue up 14.9%. H1 OPM came in at 55.3% on cumulative sales of ¥1,757M. So the pullback was not about the company slowing down. The simpler reading is that the September 2025 peak — which more than tripled the May 2024 low of ¥492 — was reached on thin trading volume. Sakaguchi family ownership is 68.2%, the only other disclosed 5%+ holder is VIS Advisors at 5.08%, and the effective free float that institutional buyers can actually trade is about a quarter of the share count. A thin float lets a small flow of buying push the price a long way up, and it also lets a small slowing of that buying push the price most of the way back down.

03 · WHERE WE STAND NOW On May 25, 2026 the company filed two announcements at the same time. The first was a new buyback: up to 600,000 shares (3.09% of shares outstanding ex-treasury) for up to ¥500M, running through November 27, 2026. The second was a correction notice. The company restated the page-view figures it had reported in six prior filings, going back to the FY7/25 annual results. Importantly, the correction was only about page-view counts. No revenue or profit number was changed. The reason is simple: brokerages pay Rakumachi a flat monthly fee for each listing they post — they do not pay per page-view. So restating page-views does not change anything the company actually bills. The error itself grew with each later release. The FY7/25 annual page-view total was restated by −0.6%, the Q1 FY7/26 figure by −5.6%, and the H1 FY7/26 figure by −8.5%. After the correction, H1 FY7/26 YoY page-view growth falls from +23.2% to +12.7%. The company described the cause as an internal review of its page-view aggregation process and stopped there. The next four quarters will answer three questions. First, whether the company adds a clear explanation of how it now counts page-views, plus several years of restated monthly data, so the audience-growth picture can be checked against the underlying records. Second, whether the company starts using the ¥4.08bn it has parked in the US-dollar bond portfolio (about two-thirds of total assets, earning a fifth of what the same yen earns inside the operating business) to fund larger buybacks. Third, whether the niche moat is widening or maturing, as Japanese peers trade at 6.7x forward EV/EBIT against Rakumachi's 10.0x.

02 · CONTENTION

Live Investor Debates

Three open questions surface in the company's recent quarterly disclosures and in the May 25, 2026 correction notice. Each one settles a different part of the multiple.

DEBATE 01 · DISCLOSURE INTEGRITY
Is the May 25, 2026 page-view correction a one-time mistake that the company can close by explaining how it now counts page-views — or is it a sign that investors should mark down the audience-growth story they paid for?
BULL Bulls observe that revenue and profit numbers were not restated, that agency contracts are per-listing rather than per-impression so the page-view figure is descriptive rather than load-bearing for cash flow, and that the corrected half-year operating margin still expanded eleven points year-on-year to 55.3%. The corrected page-view total still grew +22.8% in FY7/2025 and +12.7% in the first half of FY7/2026, leaving the directional trajectory intact. The view holds if the Q3 FY7/2026 release in June 2026 publishes a three-year restated monthly page-view series with a methodology footnote, and the rate of new error correction in subsequent quarters falls to zero.
BEAR Bears observe that the error magnitude grew with each successive disclosure — 0.6% in the FY7/2025 annual, 5.6% in the Q1 FY7/2026 tanshin, 8.5% in the half-year figure — a pattern more consistent with structural drift in the aggregation pipeline than with a one-time bug. The notice was packaged the same day as a new buyback authorization, the company has named no external assurance provider, and the eight-year audit relationship with Ark LLC has not produced a comment letter on the corrected series. The view holds if the FY7/2026 annual disclosure in September 2026 introduces no third-party KPI assurance and contains a further downward restatement of any prior-period operating metric.
DEBATE 02 · CAPITAL DEPLOYMENT
Is the ¥4.08bn US-dollar bond portfolio (about two-thirds of total assets) a deliberately maintained foreign-currency reserve that disciplines the operating business, or excess capital earning a fifth of the operating return the same yen would earn redeployed in the platform?
BULL Bulls observe that the company has authorized 850,000 shares and ¥800M of buyback so far in FY7/26 (two new tranches in twelve months); that the share count has fallen from 21.15M to 19.75M after the October 2025 cancellation of 1.4M treasury shares; and that the FY7/26 dividend guidance of ¥13 per share is the fifth consecutive year of dividend increases. The dollar-bond portfolio earns 5.5% in interest — well above Japanese deposit rates. And because founder Sakaguchi owns 68.2%, every share the company buys back makes his stake bigger, while issuing new shares to fund acquisitions or expansion would dilute him — so his incentives line up with the buyback path the company is already running. The view holds if the FY7/27 capital return (buybacks plus dividends) reaches at least ¥1.5bn, with the bond-portfolio balance falling below ¥3.5bn during the year.
BEAR Bears observe that roughly two-thirds of total assets sit in non-operating securities, that the stated dividend payout target remains 20% while the operating business earns a return on capital of 28.2%, and that twenty years without a single acquisition or overseas expansion produces a value-extractive rather than value-creative deployment record. The portfolio's FX exposure was disclosed as a material risk factor in the FY7/2025 annual securities report, and management has published no multi-year total-return framework anchored to a portfolio drawdown timetable. The view holds if the FY7/2026 annual disclosure in September 2026 reaffirms the 20% payout target without introducing a stepped floor, and the bond-portfolio carrying value ends FY7/2026 above ¥4bn.
DEBATE 03 · MOAT TRAJECTORY
Is the specialist niche-portal moat widening as the partner-store base laps a 24-times-untapped agency total available market, or maturing as the corrected page-view growth rate halves and member-acquisition decelerates?
BULL Bulls observe that the company has 5,459 brokerage agencies as paying customers — about 4% of the roughly 130,000 licensed brokerages in Japan. That leaves 96% of the addressable market still untouched. YouTube subscribers grew +35.3% YoY to 1.45M, cumulative views passed one billion in late 2025, and Premium subscribers grew +14.7% with ARPU up roughly 17%. No domestic competitor of scale has emerged in the specialist investment-property category. The view holds if the Q4 FY7/26 release in September 2026 prints partner-store count above 5,700, registered-member growth above +13% YoY, and Premium-subscriber growth above +15%.
BEAR Bears observe that registered-member growth has slowed from +18% in FY7/22 to +13.2% in FY7/25 to +12.4% in H1 FY7/26; that corrected H1 page-view growth has halved from +23.2% to +12.7%; and that partner-store growth at +9.0% is the slowest rate the company has reported in the last several quarters. The FY7/25 annual report names the entry of the big generalist residential portals — SUUMO (run by Recruit Holdings) and LIFULL HOME'S — into the investment-property segment as an explicit competitive risk. The view holds if the FY7/26 annual disclosure prints partner-store growth below +9%, registered-member growth below +12%, and corrected page-view growth below +12% YoY.
03 · CATALYST

Capital-Efficiency Levers

Three disclosure or capital-policy levers drawn from the company's recent quarterly filings and the May 25, 2026 correction notice. Each could reweight the multiple without requiring higher earnings.

LEVER 01 · DISCLOSURE
Have an outside auditor check the new page-view numbers, and publish how they are now counted
Page-view restatement magnitude · 2026-05-25 correction notice
FY7/2025 annual
−0.6%
Q1 FY7/2026
−5.6%
H1 FY7/2026
−8.5%
Corrected H1 PV growth YoY
+12.7%
Error magnitude grew with each successive release · directional trajectory still positive but halved at the most recent print
The company has explained which past page-view numbers were wrong. It has not yet explained how it will avoid making the same mistake again. Two things would fix that. First, a plain-language description in the next earnings release of how page-views are now counted — which logs the company uses, how duplicate views are removed, what counts as a view. Second, an outside auditor (Ark LLC, the firm that already audits the financial statements, is the obvious choice) confirming that the new counting method is being applied consistently. Without these, investors will start applying a discount to every other number Rakumachi reports, even if those other numbers are not wrong. The cost is roughly ¥3–5M per year in audit fees, plus some internal IT work.
Cost to mgmt
Audit fee + one supplementary table per briefing
Earliest trigger
Q3 FY7/2026 release · June 2026
LEVER 02 · CAPITAL POLICY
Write the actual buyback behavior into a multi-year payout policy, and fund it by drawing down the bond portfolio
Buyback cadence · trailing 12 months · each bar is one tranche, ¥M actually spent
Sep 2024 · tranche 1
¥391M
Dec 2024 · tranche 2
¥357M
Apr 2025 · tranche 3
¥451M
Sep 2025 · tranche 4
¥706M
Mar 2026 · tranche 5 (authorized)
¥300M
May 2026 · tranche 6 (running)
¥500M
Share count · issued
21.15M → 19.75M (−6.6%)
DPS · annual
¥8 → ¥10 → ¥13E (5th lift)
Six tranches in ~20 months, totaling ~¥2.7bn (¥2.2bn used + ¥0.5bn running) · 1.4M treasury shares cancelled Oct 2025 · DPS up every year since FY7/22
Look at the chart above. In FY7/25 the company spent ¥0.28bn on dividends and ¥1.20bn on buybacks — together about 126% of the year's net income of ¥1.17bn. But the company's written dividend policy is still just "payout ratio around 20%." So what the company actually does and what it formally says it does have drifted far apart. The fix is to write the actual behavior into a formal multi-year payout policy: for example, "we will return 80–100% of net income to shareholders every year, partly by drawing ¥1.0–1.5bn per year out of the US-dollar bond portfolio." That turns each quarterly buyback from a one-off surprise into a multi-year plan investors can underwrite. Each yen taken out of those bonds and used for buybacks earns roughly five times what it was earning sitting in the bonds. Cost to management: one board resolution and one paragraph added to the IR materials.
Cost to mgmt
One board resolution + one IR slide
Earliest trigger
FY7/2026 annual · September 2026
LEVER 03 · CAPITAL POLICY
Founder sells part of his own shares to institutional investors, opening the float and clearing the way for a TSE Prime upgrade
Ownership concentration · float and re-rating ceiling
Sakaguchi family (founder + spouse)
68.2%
VIS Advisors LP
5.1%
Director Aoyagi + others
~1%
Effective free float
~26%
Founder bloc and locked positions leave roughly a quarter of the share count actually trading · TSE Prime float threshold sits well above this
Founder Sakaguchi owns 68.2% of Rakumachi. As a result, only about 26% of the company's shares actually trade on the market — what is called a "thin float." A thin float is the structural reason a business with a 48.9% operating margin trades at single-digit forward EV/EBIT: large institutional investors cannot build a position of any size without pushing the price up against themselves. The fix is for Sakaguchi to sell 3–4 million of his own existing shares to institutional buyers. (To be clear: these are shares Sakaguchi already owns, transferred to new buyers. They are not new shares issued by the company — so there is no dilution of existing shareholders.) The sale lifts the tradable float above the roughly 35% minimum that TSE Prime requires. Then the company publishes a timetable for upgrading from TSE Standard to TSE Prime. Preparing for Prime forces the company to set up a board compensation committee, publish English-language investor materials, and meet the disclosure standards that larger listed Japanese companies already meet. Cost to Sakaguchi personally: capital-gains tax on the sale. Cost to the company: the legal and IR work for the upgrade package. Earliest disclosure window: the annual shareholders' meeting in October 2026.
Cost to mgmt
Legal package + IR system buildout
Earliest trigger
AGM · October 2026
04 · VALUATION

Scenario Pathways

Three internally-consistent scenarios across the next four quarters. Each describes a different bundle of disclosure and operating outcomes — no single scenario is forecast; they are analytical bookends.

BEAR SCENARIO
¥700 – ¥850
−28% to −13%
implied multiple · ~5.5–6.5x EV/EBIT (fwd)
The corrected page-view trajectory is not audited; partner-store and member growth slow further; the payout target stays at 20% and the bond portfolio is left intact.

The bear band of ¥700–¥850 implies ~5.5–6.5x FY7/2027 forward EV/EBIT — below the listed Japanese small-cap digital-marketplace peer median of 6.7x (LIFULL 8.0x, GA Technologies 5.3x, Temairazu 4.5x) and toward the private-buyer 5–7x cohort that has cleared in the Japanese small-cap listing-platform space.

BASE SCENARIO
¥950 – ¥1,200
−3% to +23%
implied multiple · ~7.5–9.5x EV/EBIT (fwd)
The Q3 release publishes a methodology footnote and a restated three-year monthly page-view series; FY7/2026 guidance is met within 5%; capital return continues at the FY7/2025 cadence without policy restatement.
BULL SCENARIO
¥1,350 – ¥1,650
+38% to +69%
implied multiple · ~10–13x EV/EBIT (fwd)
One of the three levers lands: KPI assurance is introduced, a multi-year total-return policy with a bond-portfolio drawdown timetable is published, or a secondary plus a Prime upgrade timetable opens the float.

The bull band of ¥1,350–¥1,650 implies ~10–13x FY7/2027 forward EV/EBIT — within the Japanese listed digital-marketplace upper band (Azoom 14.5x, LIFULL 8.0x) and at the lower end of the global niche-portal cohort (Rightmove, REA, Hemnet trade at ~17–25x). The implied multiple at the upper bull band sits roughly three turns above today's 10.0x.

SUM-OF-PARTS · CORE PORTAL PLATFORM
Listing + Proposal + Advertising + Premium + Valuation lines · single reportable segment, ~88% of operating revenue ex non-operating yield
FY7/2026 platform revenue (guide)~¥3.50bn
Segment operating margin (FY7/2026 guide)~51.4%
Implied platform OP mid-case~¥1.80bn
Peer multiple (LIFULL 8.0x, GA Tech 5.3x, Temairazu 4.5x, Azoom 14.5x)~7–12x EV/EBIT
Mid-case implied platform EV: ~¥14–22bn at 8–12x forward platform OP
PEER MULTIPLE LADDER · 2026-05-26
Listed JP digital-marketplace peer set · EV recomputed at current snapshot price · buffett-code ML peer set unavailable, working fallback
6037 Rakumachi (this profile)10.0x fwd · ROCE 28%
2120 LIFULL (residential portal, generalist)~8.0x fwd · ROCE 8%
3491 GA Technologies (proptech, transaction-side)~5.3x fwd · ROCE 9%
3496 AZOOM (single-asset real-estate marketplace)~14.5x fwd · ROCE 16%
2477 Temairazu (small-cap digital marketplace, 73.6% OPM)~4.5x fwd · ROCE 16%
4499 Speee (excluded · FY9/2026 guidance OP loss)n/m
JP listed peer median ~6.7x fwd · Rakumachi sits at ~50% premium on the narrow net-cash EV that matches market convention, justified by category-best 48.9% OPM and 28.2% ROCE
SUM-OF-PARTS · CROSS-CHECK TOTAL
Core portal platform + non-operating bond portfolio + working cash — the EV bridge to per-share
Core platform EV (mid-case at 10x fwd OP)~¥18bn
USD bond portfolio (held-to-maturity, at carrying)¥4.08bn
Operating cash + short-term securities¥1.41bn
Implied SOTP equity value~¥23.5bn
Implied SOTP per share (÷ 19.64M ex-treasury)~¥1,200
SOTP supports BASE–BULL when one of the three CATALYST levers lands · current market cap ¥19.3bn vs SOTP mid-case ~¥23.5bn
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This is not investment advice.

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