J|I Japan Investor Interface · Compounder Profile
TSE PRIME · 6328 · FY end DEC 荏原実業株式会社
EBARA JITSUGYO CO., LTD.
Engineering, equipment and proprietary products that treat water, air and waste for Japan's municipalities and industry
Last Close
¥2,446Jun 30, 2026
−17% from Feb-26 peak · +8% off the June low
Market Cap / EV
¥58.0bn / ¥45.7bn EV
net cash ¥12.4bn (21% of cap) · borrowings ¥1.5bn
EV / EBIT · forward
7.2x
premium peers ~17–19x · FY26E OP ¥6.3bn
ROCE · trailing
22%
up from ~18% in FY24 on the profit jump · ROE 17%
Op Margin · group
14.9% · grp
FY25 14.9% · FY26E 14.3% · ~548 employees
Shares & Float
23.7M sh · ~96% float
NAVF 7.6% · Hikari 7.9% · Master Trust 11.9%
INTRODUCTION

What does EBARA JITSUGYO do?

EBARA JITSUGYO sells engineering, equipment and proprietary products that clean water, air and waste for Japan's cities and factories. The company runs three businesses. Its Engineering business wins water and sewerage plant orders directly from municipalities, then designs and builds the plant. Its Trading business resells pumps, blowers and air-conditioning equipment made by EBARA Corporation. Its Manufacturing business sells products the company develops itself, such as ozone systems, deodorization equipment and storage batteries.

The company is paid mainly by project. Each Engineering and Manufacturing order is won, built and billed, so revenue depends on the orders the company is working through. The Trading business adds steady repeat sales as customers reorder equipment. There is little pure recurring revenue, so the order backlog is how the company shows investors its future workload.

The business matters because Japan must renew aging water and sewerage infrastructure and cut carbon for decades, and EBARA JITSUGYO designs the plant that does this work. In FY2025 the company earned ¥41.21bn of revenue and ¥6.12bn of operating profit, a 14.9% group operating margin. It carries net cash and needs little capital to operate, so return on capital employed (ROCE = operating profit divided by capital employed) was about 22%. That measures how well the operating business turns the capital it uses into profit.

The stock does not reflect that quality. At ¥2,446 on June 30, 2026, the operating business was valued at about 7.2x forward EV/EBIT (enterprise value divided by forecast operating profit), and net cash equaled roughly 21% of the market value. The question is why investors apply a single-digit multiple to a net-cash company with a 22% ROCE, a record backlog, and an activist investor on its share register. This profile answers that in four steps: how the share price reached this level, what investors are debating, what management could do to narrow the discount, and what the business and the cash are worth.

01 · PRICE REGIME

What has driven the stock over the past two years?

EBARA JITSUGYO designs and builds water and sewerage plant for Japan's municipalities, resells EBARA Corporation pumps and air equipment, and makes its own environmental products. It wins most work by direct order from the public sector, so its order backlog measures the workload it has already secured.

6328 vs TOPIX · 24 months · daily candles + volume
Peak ¥2,960 · 2026-02-27 Trough ¥2,259 · 2026-06-03 Today ¥2,446
EBARA JITSUGYO · daily candles 60-day SMA TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · When investors paid up for the record year The shares reached ¥2,960 on February 27, 2026, valuing the operating business at about 9–10x EV/EBIT. The move followed a run of good news. On February 9, 2026 the company reported record FY2025 results, with operating profit up 44.0%, authorized a ¥1.0bn buyback, and raised its payout target. A week later news that an activist had filed shareholder proposals added to the optimism. Investors were paying for a record year and the prospect of more cash being returned.

02 · When the multiple fell back From the peak the shares fell about 17% to a low of ¥2,259 on June 3, 2026. Two things drove the de-rating. First, small-cap and value stocks were sold across Tokyo through the second quarter, and EBARA JITSUGYO trades thinly. Second, the activist's three proposals were rejected at the March 24, 2026 annual meeting, which told the market that minority holders could not force the cash off the balance sheet. The multiple compressed even though earnings did not fall.

03 · When the first-quarter print and the buyback landed On May 11, 2026 the company reported its first quarter for FY2026, with operating profit up 15.9% and the order backlog up 19.6% to ¥32.77bn — a record. The buyback was running underneath the price: by June 4, 2026 the company had purchased 289,000 of the authorized 600,000 shares for ¥730.9mn. The operating numbers kept improving while the share price stayed near its low.

04 · Where the stock stands now The stock closed at ¥2,446 on June 30, 2026 — up about 8% off the June low and about 17% below the February peak, at roughly 7.2x forward EV/EBIT. Net cash is worth 21% of the market value, the order backlog is at a record, the ¥1.0bn buyback is still running, and the activist remains on the share register. The next four quarters depend mainly on one question — whether management deploys the cash and discloses a clearer capital framework, or whether the discount holds.

02 · CONTENTION

Live Investor Debates

Three investor debates explain the single-digit multiple. They appear in the company's disclosures, the share-price decline, and the gap between the quality of the business and its valuation.

DEBATE 01 · VALUATION
Is 7x too cheap for a net-cash, 22%-ROCE company, or is it fair?

EV/EBIT values the operating business after removing net cash, so 7.2x is the market's price for the plant and product businesses alone. The debate is whether that price is too low for a company with a 22% ROCE, or whether the idle cash and securities flatter the returns and deserve a discount.

BULL Bulls argue the multiple has fallen too far. At 7.2x forward EV/EBIT the company shows a 17% return on equity, a 22% ROCE that is rising, a 14.9% group operating margin, net cash worth 21% of the market value, and a record backlog. It trades in line with the cheapest plant contractor, Tsukishima (7.3x), below Metawater (10.5x), and at less than half Kurita (17.1x) and Organo (18.8x) — names with comparable or lower margins. The key evidence would be the multiple re-rating toward the water-treatment band as the cash and cross-holdings are reduced.
BEAR Bears note the multiple may be fair. The balance sheet holds ¥12.4bn of net cash and ¥9.35bn of investment securities that earn little, so the headline returns are flattered by capital that is not working. The activist Nippon Active Value Fund (NAVF), which owns 7.58%, put exactly this case to a shareholder vote and lost on March 24, 2026, which showed that minority holders cannot force the cash out. The bear case stands if net cash and investment securities are still rising when FY2026 results are reported.
DEBATE 02 · GROWTH
Is the record backlog a durable runway, or just lumpy project work?

The company books an order, then converts it to revenue as it builds. Order backlog of ¥32.77bn is the work already won. The debate is whether that backlog reflects a steady pipeline of infrastructure renewal, or whether a few large one-off contracts make the growth look more durable than it is.

BULL Bulls point to a record backlog of ¥32.77bn, up 19.6% year-on-year at the first quarter, behind a fourth straight record year (FY2026 guidance: sales ¥44.0bn, operating profit ¥6.3bn). The demand is structural: Japan must renew aging water and sewerage plant and cut carbon, which feeds biomethanation, PFAS removal and energy-saving building work. The company's long-term vision targets ¥60.0bn of sales and ¥8.0bn of operating profit by FY2030. Watch whether Engineering revenue converts the backlog without giving up margin.
BEAR Bears observe that the growth is lumpy. First-quarter orders rose 40.5%, but a single ¥2.7bn marine-seed-production order in the Manufacturing business flattered that figure, and Engineering revenue actually fell in the quarter. The company's 378 certified engineers cap how much work it can build at once. Acquisitions, the lever meant to open new business areas, were under-used in the prior plan, at about ¥0.2bn spent against a ¥1.0–2.5bn target. The bear case holds if organic Engineering revenue stays soft once the one-off order is stripped out.
DEBATE 03 · EBARA LINK
Is the EBARA relationship a moat, or a dependency?

EBARA JITSUGYO is the authorized distributor for EBARA Corporation pumps and air equipment, and buys equipment from the EBARA Group for its own plants. EBARA Corporation owns only 0.24% of the company, so it is not a parent. The debate is whether this link protects the business or leaves it exposed to terms it does not control.

BULL Bulls see two soft moats. First, the EBARA Group distributorship is a stable, capital-light channel: the Trading business is 27% of sales at a 16.7% operating margin. Second, an 80-year public-sector water and sewerage franchise — built on certifications, a long reference list, 378 engineers and government-adopted research — that new entrants cannot copy quickly. Both keep competitors out of work the company already does. The bull case is supported if Trading and Engineering margins hold through the cycle.
BEAR Bears say the EBARA link is a dependency dressed as a moat. The company bought ¥4.23bn of equipment from the EBARA Group in FY2025 and owed it about ¥3.0bn. EBARA Corporation sets the distribution terms yet owns only 0.24% of the company, so the relationship could turn against it. Public-sector plant work is won by competitive bid and limited by municipal budgets. The bear case is confirmed by any change in the EBARA distribution agreement or a step-down in the Trading margin.
03 · CATALYST

Capital-Efficiency Levers

The multiple could rise even without higher earnings if management reduces the reasons for the current discount. All three changes below depend mainly on management decisions.

LEVER 01 · CAPITAL POLICY
Deploy the ¥12.4bn net cash and ¥9.35bn of investment securities
Idle capital vs capital returned (¥bn)
Net cash
¥12.4bn
Investment securities
¥9.35bn
Buyback authorized
¥1.0bn
Buyback done
¥0.73bn
the buyback so far is small next to the cash and securities still on the balance sheet
Net cash equals 21% of the market value and the investment securities earn little, so a credible plan to reduce both would lift the value attributed to shareholders. The ¥1.0bn buyback (¥0.73bn done by early June) and the payout target raised to 40% are a start, but small next to ¥12.4bn of net cash plus ¥9.35bn of securities. A stated capital-return framework, a target cash level, and a timetable to run off cross-holdings would turn one-off actions into a policy investors can rely on. The next check is whether FY2026 results add a clearer capital-return framework.
Cost to mgmt
One board resolution
Earliest trigger
FY2026 results · Feb 2027
LEVER 02 · GROWTH
Convert the ¥32.8bn backlog toward the ¥60bn FY2030 vision
Backlog and the path to the long-term vision (¥bn sales)
Order backlog (Q1)
¥32.8bn
FY2026 guidance
¥44.0bn
FY2027 plan
¥45.0bn
FY2030 vision
¥60.0bn
backlog covers near-term sales, but the step to the FY2030 vision needs new business areas
A record ¥32.8bn backlog already covers near-term sales, so the question is what closes the gap to the FY2030 vision of ¥60.0bn. Infrastructure renewal and decarbonization fund the organic base, but the company's own plan needs acquisitions and new business areas to reach the target, and that lever was under-used before (about ¥0.2bn spent in the prior plan). Each quarterly order print and any acquisition announcement shows whether the backlog is converting and the new-area push is real. The signal to watch is Engineering revenue growth that holds once the one-off order is excluded.
Cost to mgmt
Growth + R&D spend
Earliest trigger
Each quarterly order print
LEVER 03 · DISCLOSURE
Close the gap between a 7x multiple and a 22% ROCE with clearer disclosure
Where EBARA JITSUGYO sits on forward EV/EBIT
EBARA JITSUGYO (6328)
7.2x
Tsukishima (6332)
7.3x
Metawater (9551)
10.5x
Kurita (6370)
17.1x
Organo (6368)
18.8x
EBARA JITSUGYO is priced with the plant contractors, far below the premium water-treatment names
EBARA JITSUGYO trades with the plant contractors, at less than half the premium water-treatment names, even though its group margin is comparable or higher and its balance sheet holds net cash. A cost-of-capital management policy, order disclosure by segment, a run-off timetable for cross-holdings, and a stated capital-return framework would let investors value the operating business closer to the water-treatment band. The Tokyo Stock Exchange push for cost-of-capital-conscious management and the activist on the register are both forcing functions. The next check is whether the integrated report or a plan update adds these disclosures.
Cost to mgmt
Disclosure + policy
Earliest trigger
Integrated report · 2026
04 · VALUATION

Scenario Pathways

At ¥2,446 (June 30, 2026), using company guidance for FY2026 operating profit of ¥6.3bn, an enterprise value of ~¥45.7bn implies about 7.2x forward EV/EBIT. The three scenarios below are JII estimates, not company guidance.

BEAR SCENARIO
¥2,050 – ¥2,350
−16% to −4%
implied multiple · ~6–7x EV/EBIT (fwd)
In the bear case, the market keeps treating EBARA JITSUGYO as over-capitalized: the multiple stays at ~6–7x, the cash and securities stay idle, and the small-cap discount holds.
What would have to happen
  • Cash and securities stay idle; no new capital framework.
  • The activist loses again at the next vote.
  • Backlog normalizes as the one-off order rolls off.
  • Thin liquidity keeps small-cap demand weak.

Even here, net cash limits the downside: it is worth ~21% of the current market value, a cushion that would matter in any strategic valuation.

BASE SCENARIO
¥2,900 – ¥3,400
+19% to +39%
implied multiple · ~8–10x EV/EBIT (fwd)
The multiple moves toward the plant-contractor top end as buybacks continue and management delivers one clear capital-efficiency step — a cross-holding run-off or a stated capital-return framework.
What would have to happen
  • Buyback continues and the payout target of 40% holds.
  • ROCE holds near 20% as the backlog converts.
  • One capital-efficiency step: cross-holding run-off or framework.
  • EV/EBIT widens toward the high-single digits.
BULL SCENARIO
¥3,700 – ¥4,300
+51% to +76%
implied multiple · ~11–13x EV/EBIT (fwd)
The cash and securities are deployed and investors re-rate the operating business toward the water-treatment band, while backlog conversion and acquisitions begin to underwrite the FY2030 vision.
What would have to happen
  • Cash and securities are deployed into returns or growth.
  • The multiple re-rates toward the water-treatment band.
  • Backlog conversion plus acquisitions support the FY2030 vision.
  • Net cash falls as buybacks accelerate.

The implied fundamental value could be higher: the sum-of-parts below points to ¥2,920–4,025 if investors give most of the cash and securities full value.

SUM-OF-PARTS · OPERATING BUSINESS
Engineering, Trading and Manufacturing — the three water and environmental businesses
FY2026E operating profit¥6,300M
FY2026E revenue · growth¥44,000M · +6.8%
Group operating margin~14.3% (FY25 14.9%)
Order backlog (Q1)¥32.77bn · +19.6%
Assumed EV / EBIT8–12x
Implied operating EV ~¥50.4–75.6bn at 8–12x — base case 9–10x is about ¥56.7–63.0bn.
SUM-OF-PARTS · NET CASH + SECURITIES
Net cash and a portfolio of investment securities being reduced
Net cash (Q1 FY2026)¥12,360M
Borrowings¥1,523M
Net cash / market cap21%
Investment securities¥9,349M
Haircut on securities20–30%
Net cash at full value plus securities at ~¥6.5–7.5bn after a haircut for cross-holdings and illiquidity.
PEER MULTIPLE LADDER · forward EV / EBIT
Domestic water and environmental engineers (live prices; EV on each name's net cash or net debt)
EBARA JITSUGYO (6328)~7.2x
Tsukishima Holdings (6332)~7.3x
Metawater (9551)~10.5x
Kurita Water Industries (6370)~17.1x
Organo (6368)~18.8x
Live snapshot, June 30, 2026; Metawater, Kurita and Organo carry net debt. Maezawa (6489) excluded as too illiquid.
EQUITY BRIDGE · implied value per share
Operating EV plus net cash plus securities, divided by ex-treasury shares
Operating EV (8–12x FY26E OP)¥50.4–75.6bn
+ Net cash (full value)¥12.36bn
+ Securities (after haircut)¥6.5–7.5bn
= Implied equity value¥69.3–95.5bn
÷ ex-treasury shares23,727,118
= Implied value per share¥2,920–4,025
vs ¥2,446 close+19% to +65%
Mid-case ~¥3,400 per share. A JII estimate, not a forecast or target; buybacks would raise the per-share value if they cut the share count below this assumption.
Important Disclaimer · 重要なご注意

This is not investment advice.

Japan Investor Interface Co., Ltd. ("JII") is an investor-relations (IR) consultancy. JII is not a registered investment advisor, financial advisor, broker-dealer, or securities firm in any jurisdiction. JII is not registered as a Financial Instruments Business Operator (金融商品取引業者) under Japan's Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. JII does not have a 投資助言・代理業 registration and does not provide investment advice or solicit the purchase, sale, or holding of any security.

JII Compounders is an editorial publication. Each profile is an analytical study of how publicly disclosed information about a Japanese listed company has been received by the market. It is intended for educational and research purposes for IR professionals, finance students, journalists, and other readers interested in corporate disclosure practice. Nothing in this publication constitutes a recommendation, opinion, suggestion, or solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security, derivative, or other financial instrument. Price targets, scenario ranges, multiples, and comparable-company references are illustrative of analytical method only and must not be interpreted as JII's investment opinion. JII does not have an investment opinion on any security discussed.

No reliance. The information presented may be incomplete, out of date, or incorrect. Forward-looking statements are inherently uncertain. Past price performance does not indicate future results. Estimates and scenario figures are not predictions and may not be achieved. JII makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, regarding the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or reliability of any information in this publication.

No fiduciary or advisory relationship. Reading this publication does not create any advisory, fiduciary, or professional relationship between you and JII. Before making any investment, tax, accounting, legal, or other decision, you should consult qualified, licensed advisors in your jurisdiction and conduct your own independent due diligence based on primary disclosures issued by the company concerned.

Conflicts & positions. JII may provide paid IR diagnostic, translation, or interpretation services to Japanese listed companies, including companies discussed in this publication. JII does not trade in or hold positions in the securities of companies profiled. Where a JII engagement exists with a profiled company, that fact will be disclosed at the top of the profile.

Trademarks & data. Company names, logos, tickers, and product names referenced are the property of their respective owners. Share-price data is licensed from third-party providers. TradingView is a trademark of TradingView, Inc. All rights reserved.

本資料は、日本の金融商品取引法に基づく投資助言・代理業ではなく、特定の有価証券の売買その他の取引の勧誘・推奨を目的とするものではありません。本資料は教育・研究を目的とした分析記事であり、JII(株式会社ジャパン・インベスター・インターフェース)は、本資料の内容に基づく投資判断について一切の責任を負いません。投資の判断はご自身の責任と独立した調査に基づいて行ってください。

All Compounder Profiles · Methodology Language: EN · JP Japan Investor Interface Co., Ltd.