J|I Japan Investor Interface · Compounder Profile
TSE GROWTH · 7378 · FY end OCT 株式会社アシロ
ASIRO Inc.
Runs Japan's Bennavi lawyer-referral websites, where lawyers pay monthly listing fees to be found by people with a legal problem
Last Close
¥1,449Jun 9, 2026
39% below the Sept-2025 peak of ¥2,379
Market Cap / EV
¥10.3bn / ¥8.8bn EV
net cash ¥1.5bn · no securities · founder 26% + AVI 35%
EV / EBIT · forward
5.8x
FY26E OP ¥1.5bn (+5.7%) · ~6.2x on FY25
ROCE · trailing
~42%
ROE 37.8% FY25 · capital-light
Op Margin · group
21.4% · FY26E
Media segment 32.6% · Q1 just 17.0%
Shares & Float
7.08M ex-tr · 7.38M issued
founder 26% · AVI 35% (activist) · thin float
INTRODUCTION

What does ASIRO do?

ASIRO sells advertising on legal-information websites. Its core product is Bennavi, a set of eight sites — one each for divorce, traffic-accident, inheritance, labor, criminal, debt-collection, debt-restructuring and IT cases — where a person with a legal problem can find a lawyer who handles that exact kind of case. People read the sites for free. Lawyers pay ASIRO a fixed monthly fee for each advertising slot they hold, so revenue rises as the number of slots rises and renews every month. ASIRO also runs “derived” media that earn a fee per inquiry (a job-change site and detective and people-search sites), a recruiting arm that places lawyers and accountants for a success fee, and a small insurance unit.

The legal websites are the heart of the company. They earn recurring monthly fees, need almost no physical assets, and carry the group’s profit: in FY2025 the Media segment earned a 32.6% operating margin. Because the slots renew, the business compounds quietly as long as ASIRO keeps adding lawyers and lifting the price per slot. Two things move profit most: how much ASIRO spends to win site visitors and new advertisers, and how quickly its newer bets — a loss-making insurance unit and a new AI legal-check tool — turn into paying revenue.

FY2025 (the year to October 2025) was a breakout. Revenue rose 41.6% to ¥6.65bn and operating profit more than tripled to ¥1.42bn, a 21.4% group margin, after a heavy-investment FY2023 had pushed margin down to 1.7%. Return on equity reached 37.8%, and because the business uses very little capital, its return on capital employed is higher still. ASIRO holds about ¥1.5bn of net cash and no investment securities, and has raised its dividend each year since it began paying one in FY2022.

Two events reset the stock in 2026. First, a UK activist investor, Asset Value Investors (AVI), built a 35% stake — larger than founder-CEO Hiroto Nakayama’s 26% — and management has since raised its payout policy from 30% to over 40% of profit, added a mid-year dividend, and started a ¥500m buyback. Second, ASIRO guided FY2026 to only +5% revenue and slightly lower profit, calling it a “preparation year” before growth resumes, and first-quarter operating profit fell 30%. The central question: is ASIRO a recurring-revenue legal-media compounder pausing for one year at about 5.8x operating profit, or is its growth genuinely slowing while a foreign activist sits on a third of the shares?

This profile answers that question in four steps: how the share price reached this level, what investors are debating, what could close the discount, and what the parts could be worth.

01 · PRICE REGIME

What has driven the stock over the past two years?

ASIRO earns most of its money from Bennavi, a family of legal-information websites where lawyers pay a fixed monthly fee for each advertising slot. People with a legal problem use the sites free; the lawyers pay to be found. Because the slots renew monthly and need little capital, profit depends on adding advertisers and on how much ASIRO spends to draw visitors.

7378 vs TOPIX · 24 months · daily candles + volume
Peak ¥2,379 · 2025-09-09 Trough ¥570 · 2024-08-05 Today ¥1,449
ASIRO · daily candles 60-day SMA TOPIX rebased (1308.T) Volume

01 · The 2024 base The shares bottomed at ¥570 on August 5, 2024, in that month’s market-wide selloff. They then recovered as results improved, and jumped after the FY2024 results on December 13, 2024 showed revenue up 47% and operating profit turning back up. By the end of 2024 the stock had reached about ¥1,610. Investors were paying for a recovery that had only just begun.

02 · The 2025 breakout and the September drop Through 2025 each quarterly report improved on the last, and the shares climbed to a two-year high of ¥2,379 on September 9, 2025. Days later, on September 12, the company posted third-quarter results that raised both guidance and the dividend — yet the shares fell sharply, because the implied fourth quarter looked weak after a very strong run. By October the price was about ¥1,241.

03 · The activist and capital-return re-rating FY2025 closed with operating profit up 262% and a 37.8% return on equity, reported on December 11, 2025 alongside a ¥500m buyback. Around the same time, disclosures revealed that Asset Value Investors had become the largest shareholder, and in March 2026 ASIRO raised its payout policy and dividend. The shares ran back to about ¥2,114 by February 2026 as investors priced in both the recovery and the new capital returns.

04 · The preparation-year reset ASIRO closed at ¥1,449 on June 9, 2026, about 39% below its September peak. Management has guided FY2026 to only +5% revenue and slightly lower profit, calling it a year to rebuild for faster growth from FY2027, and first-quarter operating profit fell 30% against a tough comparison. On revised guidance the operating business trades near 5.8x forward EV/EBIT after netting its cash. The year ahead depends on one question: a planned pause, or a real slowdown?

02 · CONTENTION

Live Investor Debates

Three debates explain why a fast-growing, cash-generative, founder-run legal-media company trades at one of the lowest multiples among its peers. Each debate asks a plain question. Is FY2026’s slowdown a deliberate pause or a real fade? Does a foreign activist who owns more than the founder help or threaten minority holders? Is the low multiple a bargain or a warning?

DEBATE 01 · PAUSE vs SLOWDOWN
Is FY2026’s flat profit a deliberate preparation year, or the start of a real slowdown?

ASIRO books legal-media revenue as steady monthly listing fees. But in FY2026 it chose to cut a high-priced product and to spend ahead on insurance and AI, which lowers profit now. The debate is whether this is a planned pause that sets up FY2027 growth, or demand actually weakening.

BULL Bulls read it as a deliberate pause. ASIRO chose to cut a high-priced legal-media product, so the core segment’s operating profit held flat while the company invested; first-quarter revenue still grew 8.9% and derived-media revenue grew 31%. Management has set a FY2030 revenue target of ¥20bn, three times FY2025, and says high growth resumes in FY2027. The legal sites keep adding advertisers — 1,204 paying advertiser firms at the latest count. The bull case strengthens if the FY2027 plan, due late 2026, returns to double-digit revenue growth.
BEAR Bears see growth fading. After five years averaging more than 40% revenue growth, ASIRO guided FY2026 to just +5% revenue and a 4% drop in net profit, and first-quarter operating profit fell 30%. The advertising-slot count at the core legal sites has barely moved in a year (3,332 to 3,295), and the insurance unit keeps losing money. A company that cut a profitable product to make its numbers may be closer to its ceiling than its targets suggest. The bear case is confirmed if FY2026 revenue undershoots even the modest ¥7bn plan.
DEBATE 02 · ACTIVIST
Does AVI’s 35% activist stake unlock value, or create a control overhang?

Asset Value Investors, a UK fund, holds 35% of ASIRO — more than founder-CEO Nakayama’s 26%. Its filing says it may make “important proposals.” A large outside holder can push for higher returns, but one that owns a third of a small company must also sell those shares someday. The debate is which effect dominates.

BULL Bulls point to results already on the board. Since AVI built its stake, ASIRO raised its payout policy from 30% to over 40% of profit, added a mid-year dividend, lifted the annual dividend from ¥42 to ¥65, and began a ¥500m buyback. AVI calls its approach constructive engagement on capital efficiency and governance, aligned with minority holders. The founder still owns 26%, so the company is not in play, but it is being pushed to return more cash. The bull case holds if buybacks and dividends keep widening.
BEAR Bears see an overhang. A single fund owning 35% — above the founder — eventually has to exit, and selling that block could weigh on the price for a long time. AVI’s stated right to make “important proposals” could also bring a clash with the founder over strategy or board seats. The same engagement that won a bigger dividend could turn into a public dispute, and a stock this tightly held trades thinly. The bear case grows if AVI files proposals against management or starts trimming its stake.
DEBATE 03 · VALUATION
At about 5.8x operating profit, is ASIRO a bargain or a value trap?

ASIRO trades near 5.8x forward EV/EBIT after netting cash — near the bottom of its legal-tech and media-platform peer group, which runs from about 5x to 16x. That cheap multiple sits on a business with a 38% ROE but a slowing top line and a loss-making insurance arm. The debate is whether the discount is mispricing or a fair warning.

BULL Bulls say the recurring core alone is worth most of the company. ASIRO’s legal-media segment earned ¥2.0bn of operating profit at a 33% margin, on revenue that renews monthly. At even 5–6x, the low end of the peer range, that segment alone exceeds today’s enterprise value, leaving the HR arm, the insurance unit and ¥1.5bn of net cash as upside. A 38% return on equity rarely trades this cheap unless the market expects decline. The bull case is confirmed if FY2027 growth returns and the multiple moves toward the peer median.
BEAR Bears say the multiple is cheap for reasons. Group profit is held back by an insurance unit that lost ¥160m last year and is still losing money. About 40% of revenue comes from inquiry-based “derived” media that depend on Google’s search ranking and can move with it. Earnings are guided down this year, and a 35% holder may eventually sell. A low multiple can stay low while growth slows and the insurance losses continue. This stays a value trap unless profit growth resumes and the insurance loss narrows.
03 · CATALYST

Capital-Efficiency Levers

The discount could close even without a return to fast growth, if management proves three things. Each is within its control, or at least something it can disclose more clearly.

LEVER 01 · GROWTH
Show that FY2027 growth resumes and the ¥20bn target is real
Revenue, actual then guided then target (¥bn)
FY2021
¥1.6bn
FY2025
¥6.6bn
FY2026E
¥7.0bn
FY2030 target
¥20bn
five years near 40% growth, a flat FY2026 “preparation year”, then a 3x target by FY2030
ASIRO grew revenue more than 40% a year from FY2021 to FY2025, then guided FY2026 to just +5% while it rebuilds. The clearest way to close the discount is to show that pause ending: a FY2027 plan that returns to double-digit growth, and visible progress toward the ¥20bn FY2030 revenue target, three times FY2025. The legal sites add advertisers slowly, so most of that growth must come from price per slot, the new AI legal-check tool, and the move into adjacent markets. The next check is the FY2026 results in December 2026, when management sets the FY2027 plan.
Cost to mgmt
Execution + disclosure
Earliest trigger
FY26 results · Dec 2026
LEVER 02 · OPERATIONS
Turn the insurance unit and AI tools from cost into profit
FY2025 operating profit by segment (¥m)
Media
+2,035
HR
+71
Insurance
−160
the legal-media engine funds everything; insurance is a loss the company is choosing to carry
Group margin is held down by the insurance unit, which lost ¥160m in FY2025 and ¥51m in the first quarter as ASIRO built its corporate product, bonobo, and a new AI legal-check tool. The media engine earns a 33% margin, so each yen of insurance loss that turns to breakeven drops almost straight to group profit. Management frames these as investments into large markets — more than three million small companies it sees as under-insured for legal costs. The check is whether the insurance loss narrows through FY2026 rather than widening further.
Cost to mgmt
Funded from media profit
Earliest trigger
Each quarterly release
LEVER 03 · CAPITAL
Keep widening returns under the new 40%+ payout policy
Dividend per share (¥)
FY2022
¥12.45
FY2024
¥24.18
FY2025
¥42.20
FY2026E
¥65.00
dividend up 5x in four years; payout policy raised from 30% to over 40%, plus a ¥500m buyback
In March 2026 ASIRO raised its payout policy from 30% to more than 40% of profit, added a mid-year dividend, lifted the FY2026 dividend to ¥65 (from ¥42 the year before), and started a ¥500m buyback worth about 6% of its shares. This followed AVI building its stake, and it lifts returns without spending cash the capital-light business does not need. A stated, rising-payout policy helps investors treat the cash returns as permanent rather than a one-off. The next check is whether the buyback is renewed and the payout ratio holds above 40%.
Cost to mgmt
One board resolution
Earliest trigger
FY26 results · Dec 2026
04 · VALUATION

Scenario Pathways

At ¥1,449 (June 9, 2026), with FY2026 operating-profit guidance of ¥1.5bn and net cash of about ¥1.5bn, the enterprise value of roughly ¥8.8bn implies about 5.8x forward EV/EBIT. The three scenarios below are JII estimates, not company guidance.

BEAR SCENARIO
¥1,050 – ¥1,270
−28% to −12%
implied multiple · ~4–5x EV/EBIT (fwd)
Growth keeps fading, the insurance losses persist, and AVI’s 35% stake becomes an overhang the market discounts. Investors value the operating business at only 4–5x EBIT, and the cheap multiple proves to be a fair warning rather than a bargain.
What would have to happen
  • FY2026 revenue undershoots the ¥7bn plan.
  • FY2027 guidance stays single-digit.
  • Insurance loss widens again.
  • AVI begins trimming its stake.

Even here, ¥1.5bn of net cash and a rising dividend cushion the floor.

BASE SCENARIO
¥1,500 – ¥1,700
+4% to +17%
implied multiple · ~6–7x EV/EBIT (fwd)
FY2027 growth returns to double digits, the insurance loss starts to narrow, and the buyback supports per-share value. Investors value the operating business at a mid-single-digit multiple and give more credit to the rising dividend.
What would have to happen
  • FY2026 operating profit meets the ¥1.5bn guide.
  • FY2027 returns to double-digit growth.
  • Insurance loss starts to narrow.
  • Payout ratio holds above 40%.
BULL SCENARIO
¥2,100 – ¥2,540
+45% to +75%
implied multiple · ~9–11x EV/EBIT (fwd)
Legal-media growth reaccelerates, insurance reaches breakeven, and the multiple re-rates toward the peer median as AVI’s engagement keeps lifting returns. Investors value the operating business at 9–11x and price ASIRO like the high-return franchise its 38% ROE implies.
What would have to happen
  • FY2027 returns to double-digit growth.
  • Insurance reaches breakeven.
  • Multiple re-rates toward the peer median.
  • Buyback renewed or expanded.

The bull case needs investors to price ASIRO like the high-return, capital-light franchise its returns suggest.

SUM-OF-PARTS · OPERATING BUSINESS
The legal-media, HR and insurance operations — on FY2026E group operating profit
FY26E operating profit¥1.5bn
Bear · 4–5x EV/EBIT¥6.0–7.5bn
Base · 6–7x EV/EBIT¥9.0–10.5bn
Bull · 9–11x EV/EBIT¥13.5–16.5bn
Group operating profit is struck after corporate cost and the insurance loss, so this values the whole operating business on one multiple rather than by line.
SUM-OF-PARTS · BY SEGMENT (REASONABLENESS)
Where the operating profit comes from — FY2025 segment operating profit
Media (Bennavi + derived)¥2.04bn
HR (placement)¥0.07bn
Insurance (bonobo)−¥0.16bn
Corporate & other−¥0.53bn
The recurring legal-media engine earns more than the whole group; HR is small and improving, insurance is an investment loss, and corporate cost is the gap to group profit.
SUM-OF-PARTS · CASH & DEBT
Net cash added to operating value (Jan 31, 2026)
Cash & equivalents¥1.83bn
Interest-bearing debt−¥0.33bn
Investment securities¥0.0bn
Net cash¥1.50bn
ASIRO holds no investment-securities portfolio; goodwill of ¥1.14bn from past acquisitions sits in the operating value, not added again here.
PEER MULTIPLE LADDER · forward EV / EBIT
Japanese legal-tech and media-platform operators — indicative ranges
Zigexn (3679) · vertical lead-gen media~4.7x
PR TIMES (3922) · press-release media~6.7x
ONE CAREER (4377) · recruiting media~9.3x
Visional (4194) · HR platform~11x
Bengoshi.com (6027) · legal-tech~16x
ASIRO (7378)~5.8x
Forward EV/EBIT from each peer’s current share price, net cash and operating-profit guidance (2026-06-09 snapshot). Only Zigexn is cheaper; ASIRO trades below the other four peers.
EQUITY BRIDGE · implied value per share
Operating value + net cash, divided by ex-treasury shares
Operating value (4–11x FY26E OP)¥6.0–16.5bn
+ Net cash¥1.5bn
= Implied equity value¥7.5–18.0bn
÷ ex-treasury shares7,083,413
= Implied value per share¥1,060–2,540
vs ¥1,449 close−27% to +75%
Mid-case roughly ¥1,650. A JII estimate, not a forecast or target; the main variable is whether FY2027 growth resumes and the multiple re-rates toward the peer group.
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